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Beyond Meritocracy
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Further Than the 18 Theses Go: A materialist response to the Alliance for Marxism and Animal Liberation

Young Drivers and Trapper Boy, Brown Mine, Brown, W. Va. (Underground from 7 A.M. to 5:30 P.M.) Sept. 1908. Location: Brown, West Virginia. color digital file from b&w original print

The 18 Theses on Marxism and Animal Liberation, published by the Bündnis Marxismus und Tierbefreiung, attempt something most of the Marxist left refuses to attempt: a serious political-economic engagement with animal exploitation. The piece argues that neither Marxism nor animal liberation is complete without the other — that anti-speciesist movements need historical materialism to explain why animals are exploited, and that Marxists need to recognize animal exploitation as integral to the capitalist system they oppose. The impulse is right. The critique of what the theses call "metaphysical anti-speciesism" — the various currents within the animal rights movement that can describe speciesist ideology but cannot explain its material basis — contains real insights. And the insistence that Marxists cannot simply shrug off animal exploitation as a bourgeois distraction is overdue.

But the essay's own positive argument stops short of where the materialist analysis can go, and the reasons are not incidental. They stem from a shared source: the theses try to graft animal liberation onto an orthodox Marxist framework without asking whether that framework is adequate to what it is being asked to do. The result is an argument that simultaneously claims too much and too little — too much, because it asserts that historical materialism already contains the tools needed to explain animal exploitation; too little, because the explanation it actually offers runs from the capital relation to animal exploitation, when the order of explanation runs the other way: the organized extraction of labor from living bodies is part of the material foundation on which class relations are built.

What follows is not a dismissal of the theses. It is an attempt to show that both Marxists and animal liberationists can get further than the theses take them — and that the outlines of a more fundamental framework are available if we are willing to push the materialist analysis past where orthodox categories stop.

What the theses get right

Three things in the 18 Theses deserve recognition.

First, the critique of the dominant currents in the animal rights and animal liberation movement (Theses II–VI) is largely correct. Singer's utilitarian moral philosophy, Francione's legal criticism (as the theses characterize it), and the post-structuralist anti-speciesist current can each describe how speciesist ideology functions, but none of them can explain why animals are exploited, in whose interest, or through what material mechanisms.[1] They operate at the level of consciousness, discourse, and legal norms — important terrain, but insufficient for understanding the political economy of animal exploitation. The theses are right that a movement stuck at this level will keep asking people to change their thinking without being able to explain why the thinking exists in the first place. Francione, I will argue below, gets further than the theses allow.

Second, the Maurizi formulation in Thesis IX — "We do not exploit animals because we deem them to be inferior, rather, we deem animals to be inferior because we exploit them" — is genuinely good. It captures the materialist insight that ideology follows from material relations rather than the reverse, and it applies this insight to the human-animal relation in a way that cuts through a great deal of confused debate. Anyone who has spent time in animal liberation circles will recognize how much of the discourse remains trapped in the idealist assumption that speciesism is a prejudice to be overcome through better arguments, rather than an ideological reflex of material exploitation.

Third, the theses are right that the Marxist left's dismissal of animal liberation as moralism or bourgeois sentimentality is a reflex rather than an argument. The standard objection — that animals cannot be the subject of their own liberation and therefore do not belong in the revolutionary project — is a non sequitur. The theses grant the premise (animals "can only be objects of liberation") and answer the conclusion correctly (Theses XV–XVI): the analysis of capital does not by itself generate the political decision to fight against it; that decision requires a moral and political commitment that goes beyond what the analysis alone can demonstrate. If this is true for the struggle against wage slavery, then the objection that animal liberation cannot be "deduced" from the analysis of capital proves nothing about whether it should be part of the emancipatory project.

So far, so good. The question is whether the positive account the theses build from here goes far enough.

The pivot point: Thesis XI and the definition of exploitation

The argument turns on Thesis XI, and this is where the tension in the framework becomes visible.

The theses argue that animals "do not produce surplus value and are not part of the working class," and that their exploitation "corresponds to what Marx describes as exploitation of nature" — not exploitation in the value-theoretic sense. The authors then attempt to broaden the frame by noting that Marx did not limit exploitation to surplus value production, and that enslaved people were clearly exploited even though — on the orthodox reading the theses take over here — they produced no surplus value. (That reading is itself mistaken, as we will see; but grant it for now.)

But the framing has already done its work. The theses decline to make surplus value the definition of exploitation, yet they put no general definition in its place, only an account of how animals come to be appropriated (Thesis XI): animal exploitation is called exploitation, classed with what Marx describes as the "exploitation of nature", and explained by its place in the production of capitalist profit. The capital relation remains what does the explaining, and the exploitation of animals is what it explains.

This determines the structure of the argument. Because the theses start from the capital-labor relation and work outward, animals appear as a second object of a dynamic specified without them. The theses do say that the ruling classes have exploited "also and always animals" (Introduction), and that the analysis of capital shows animal exploitation and so "must therefore include" its abolition in the struggle (Thesis XV). What they do not do is explain that longer history: the exploitation of animals is analyzed only in its capitalist form, as something capital does, and the older relation it inherits is named, and given a single sentence in Thesis IV, rather than accounted for. The argument that follows is that the explanation should run the other way.

Going deeper: exploitation as labor extraction

A more adequate materialist analysis needs to start further back.

All organisms depend on energy. Endosomatic energy is energy produced within the body — eating, metabolizing, moving. Exosomatic energy is energy produced outside the body. But exosomatic energy comes in two fundamentally different forms, and the distinction between them is critical.

The first form is energy from non-living sources: fire, wind, water, fossil fuels, nuclear fission. The second is energy drawn from other living beings — above all other animals, including other humans — and it, in turn, can be appropriated in two very different ways. You can take a living organism's stored energy and accumulated biomass: harvesting a plant for the sugars it has synthesized, felling a tree for its cellulose, cultivating yeast for the alcohol it makes. Call this energy extraction — the harvest typically kills the organism, and could not work otherwise. Or you can compel a living body's ongoing activity — its movement, force, attention, judgment, its willingness or unwillingness — for purposes you set: domesticating animals for their labor and their reproductive capacity, enslaving people, organizing wage labor. Call this labor extraction. An ox does not merely hold stored energy; it supplies ongoing pulling power that requires it to be alive, conscious, and acting. A dead ox can be eaten, but it cannot pull a plough. Animals killed for their flesh fall on the energy side of this line, since what is finally taken is accumulated biomass; but a broiler held six weeks under managed conditions is also in an ongoing arrangement that directs its life on terms it does not set and systematically overrides its needs, which places it beside the dairy cow rather than the felled tree.[2]

The distinction matters because labor extraction is a different kind of relation. A coal seam, or a felled sugarcane stalk, does not experience its extraction and can neither resist nor cooperate with it. The ox, the dairy cow, the miner do — because a living body compelled to ongoing activity has experienced needs: organism-level conditions of functioning, grounded in a neurobiological architecture shared across species, whose frustration produces identifiable pathology.[3] What makes labor extraction exploitation rather than mere resource use is precisely this — that it has a subject whose needs the arrangement must override to extract at the rate accumulation demands.

Class exploitation is one way of organizing the extraction of labor — the compelled ongoing activity of living bodies — for the benefit of those who control them: the way that runs on the controllers' setting of the terms and on a return the controlled cannot hold them to. This is true whether the form is slavery, serfdom, wage labor, or the confinement regimes in which dairy cows, laying hens, and breeding sows are managed into continuous production. The specific social and legal forms differ — property relations, surplus extraction, the reproduction of class positions — but the material logic does not. The slaveholder, the feudal lord, the factory farmer, and the capitalist all arrange social relations so that other living bodies are made to work for them.

From this perspective, the orthodox objection — that animals cannot be exploited in the relevant sense because they are property rather than free sellers of labor power — reproduces the circular reasoning that operates in every form of class exploitation. Defining a group out of the category of "the exploited" by appeal to a legal status that the exploiting class itself established is not analysis. It is the exploitation performing its own justification.

The orthodox objection has a stronger, value-theoretic form, and it is worth meeting head-on rather than stepping around it. It grants that animals are not wage laborers but insists that, like any means of production, they merely transfer value rather than create it — so "exploitation" in Marx's precise, surplus-value sense does not reach them. This concedes too much even on its own terrain. The animals whose bodies are managed into continuous production — the dairy cow's gestation and lactation, the hen's ovulation, the sow's forced breeding — perform reproductive labor that produces new value, including surplus value; they are variable capital, not constant. Refusing this repeats the error a line of readings made about chattel slavery when it classed enslaved workers as constant capital — readings David McNally traces to Weberian rather than Marxist provenance — where he shows them to have been variable capital producing surplus value at a rate of at least 300 percent on Clegg and Foley's estimate for the antebellum South.[4] But the deeper reply does not depend on winning that argument: whether or not the value form is stretched to cover animals, what makes a relation exploitative is whether it addresses or overrides the experienced needs of those it structures, not whether surplus value is extracted through a wage. The labor-extraction substrate is prior to the value form, and the value question, however it is settled, does not reach the ground the argument actually stands on.

The question is not whether animals constitute a class in the Marxist sense. It is that the organized extraction of labor from living bodies is something more fundamental than class: it is the material substrate on which class relations are built. That is a claim about what class relations are built on, not about what makes them class relations: what makes an extraction class rule is that those it works on are denied the direction of their own activity. Class exploitation among humans is one historically specific way of organizing that extraction. The confinement regimes of industrial animal agriculture are another. If the framework identifies this logic as the foundation of what it opposes in human class relations, consistency requires it to account for the same logic when applied across species.

What this reframing changes

This shift in analytical starting point has several consequences that the 18 Theses cannot reach from within their framework.

It reverses the order of explanation. The theses explain animal exploitation from the capital relation. The historical record suggests the dependence runs the other way. In much of Eurasia, the systematic exploitation of animals began well before the systematic exploitation of humans and, once traction came, helped accelerate it. The domestication of herd animals — sheep, goats, cattle, with goat herding attested by about 9,900 years ago and sheep and cattle somewhat later — was one of the earliest organizations of living exosomatic energy: for its first millennia it was largely the management of reproduction for meat, with traction following millennia later. Owning groups of animals meant control over storable, inheritable, self-expanding wealth, and once traction came, over bodies that could be made to work. Any concentrated resource that can be held and inherited — a salmon run as much as a herd — can found rank, but the herd is the one that is a reproducing body, whose fertility is managed and whose issue is owned.[5] A study of household wealth across 63 archaeological sites and site-groups found disparities rising with the domestication of plants and animals, and Old World societies, which had large domesticable mammals, diverging upward from those of North America and Mesoamerica — a divergence its authors did not anticipate and trace to those animals: first to draft animals and the extensive agriculture they allowed, later to the mounted warrior elite; animal holdings mattered before traction too, which they put down to "food on the hoof". Class societies have formed on other material bases too, intensive plant agriculture and mining among them; the Eurasian route is one of several, but it is one the theses do not take up.

Animal exploitation is not a side-effect of class society. It is part of the material foundation on which class societies were built. A framework that explains it from the capital relation has the order of explanation backwards.[6]

It exposes the productivism the theses don't recognize in themselves. Thesis XIV argues that animal liberation is now both possible and necessary because of "the current level of the development of productive forces", and concedes that the use of animals "plays an important part in the history of human civilization. This, however, does not warrant its continuation to the present day." The concession is the problem. It leaves the earlier use unquestioned, a stage the productive forces have since outgrown: productivism, however ecological its present-day emphasis. The theses' own account, from Marx and Engels, of how humans "worked their way out of nature" through social labor (Thesis VIII) presents the domination of nature as the route out of nature, and treats only its present, capitalist form as the problem. The framework developed here rejects this. The exploitation of living bodies was never justified by developmental necessity, and framing it that way already concedes the productivist logic that treats the intensification of labor extraction from living bodies as an acceptable price for material development — the same logic that justified forced industrialization in the Soviet Union.[7]

It reframes the relationship between ideology and material relations. The theses argue that speciesist ideology is an "ideological reflex" of material exploitation (Thesis IX), and they are right to insist on this against the idealist currents in the animal liberation movement. But the theses' own analysis of ideology leaves work to be done. The framework of meritocratic reasoning — the logic through which any form of class exploitation is rationalized — shows that speciesism is not merely an ideology that happens to accompany animal exploitation. It is the limit case of the reasoning form that legitimizes all class hierarchies: the point at which the denial of need-universality, which elsewhere — wherever moral worth has been universalized — operates as tacit practice, becomes explicit doctrine.[8] Nearly everyone who has interacted with another animal knows that they experience and value their lives. Yet the categories through which we classify them — as property, as livestock, as resources — are categories created by the exploiting class to facilitate extraction. Using those categories to argue that the exploitation doesn't count as exploitation is the same move that was used to argue that slavery wasn't "really" exploitation because slaves were legally classified as property.

Speciesism is where this reasoning form operates with the least friction: where social conditioning has been most effective, where the institutional machinery is most pervasive, and — decisively — where those subjected to it can mount no organized counter-pressure to force it to change: not because animals do not refuse — they balk, kick and escape — but because no one is obliged to hear the refusals they give, and confinement destroys the social life a joint refusal would need.[9] That convergence is why the circularity runs deepest here, and why recognizing it here makes it easier to recognize the same logic operating in the domains of gender, race, nationality, and class.

More to learn from the thinkers they criticize

The theses' treatment of the three anti-speciesist currents (Theses II–VI), while partially correct, moves too quickly past insights that deserve more engagement. This is especially true of Francione.

The theses group Francione with Singer and the post-structuralists as part of "metaphysical anti-speciesism." Thesis IV credits "the anti-speciesist legal criticism" with one of its "irrevocable achievements": showing "how the juristic status quo enables an economically more efficient exploitation of animals and how it fosters the required political compliance of civil society". It then judges animal rights theory as a whole "subservient to bourgeois illusions about state and law". But Francione's argument — that the property status of animals is constitutive of their exploitation, not merely reflective of it — is closer to a materialist analysis than that placement allows.

This deserves a closer look. Francione does not look to welfare legislation for progress — he argues that the property status of animals must be abolished entirely, not reformed within existing legal frameworks. His analysis of how legal categories constitute rather than merely reflect exploitation is precisely the kind of insight that a materialist framework should take seriously and extend, not dismiss because it was developed outside the Marxist tradition.

Equally, the theses do not grapple with the unity-of-oppression insight at the level where it is most powerful. They correctly argue (Thesis V) that the post-structuralist version of intersectionality often confuses "the question of the qualitative interrelation between different types of oppression" with "their political-normative assessment." But the question the theses would put in its place — "the inner and functional correlation between bourgeois relations of production and racist ideology", to take their own example — does not go far enough either. What is needed is not a ranking of oppressions or a functional account of how each serves capital, but an identification of the common material logic that operates across all of them: the organized extraction of labor from living bodies, rationalized in each case by the circular attribution of inferior status to those from whom the extraction is taking place.

What both movements tend to avoid

The theses assert (Thesis XIII) that "the oppressed, exploited classes and animals have the same enemy," and that "the class struggle for the liberation of animals is the struggle for the liberation of the proletariat" (Thesis XVIII). I understand the impulse, but I think this formulation is too clean — and that the analytical framework the theses themselves use should make them suspicious of it.

The difficulty that neither orthodox Marxists nor most animal liberationists have adequately addressed is that many workers have real material stakes in animal exploitation. This goes well beyond the obvious case of workers employed in animal agriculture. Cheap animal-derived food is part of what working-class wages buy. Cultural practices tied to animal use — from hunting to cuisine to sport — are woven into the competing solidarities (national, ethnic, regional, religious) through which most people organize their social lives and meet their needs for identity, participation, and belonging. The institutional roles through which workers engage with animal exploitation are sustained by the same logic of moral compartmentalization that sustains their participation in other exploitative arrangements: the separation of social life into distinct institutional domains, each with its own norms, in which the moral implications of one's actions are contained within the domain and do not spill over into the rest of one's life.[10]

The theses register that wage labourers "do not necessarily act in solidarity with animals" — "Workers in abattoirs even kill animals" (Thesis X) — and explain it by alienation (Thesis XVII). What they do not analyze is workers' material interest: the Introduction registers comrades' unwillingness to give up "meat and cheese" only as an attitude. Thesis XI states that "wage labourers perform the oftentimes violent appropriation in practice" and that "they execute, under capital's command, the production of surplus value." But workers are not merely executing orders. They derive real use values from animal exploitation, and the material incentives sustaining their participation cannot be wished away by identifying a shared enemy. A movement that does not reckon with this will keep producing appeals to solidarity that cannot compete with the material and social rewards of the existing arrangement.

Competing solidarities — nationalism, sectoralism, religious communalism — outcompete class solidarity partly because they address a broader range of human needs than class-based organizing typically does: not only subsistence and protection, but also identity, participation, affection, and belonging. They do this imperfectly and at great cost, reproducing internal hierarchies and restricting solidarity along non-class lines. But they do it, and class-based movements mostly do not. And the field is not level: the state tolerates or subsidizes their institutions, while class organizing operates under permanent threat. Any serious project of animal liberation — or human liberation — must build forms of collective life that address the full range of what class-structured institutions fragment and neglect. Telling people to abandon their stakes in existing arrangements without building something that addresses the needs those arrangements currently meet is not revolutionary politics. It is, ironically, the very moralism the theses identify in the anti-speciesist movement — now operating within the Marxist framework itself.[11]

Conclusion: consistency, not addition

The 18 Theses argue that each movement is inconsistent without the other, and that the analysis of capital, pursued consistently, includes animals. I want to take that one step further back. The point is not only that the analysis of capital includes animals but that the analysis of exploitation begins with them: a materialist analysis that starts from the organized extraction of labor from living bodies includes animals from the outset — and that an animal liberation movement that does not understand the material structures of class rule will keep producing moral appeals that cannot compete with the institutional machinery that produces animal exploitation.

The organized extraction of labor from living bodies is the material substrate of class domination. A society that abolishes this extraction for humans but maintains it for animals has not changed the underlying logic — it has drawn a species line through it. The institutional and ideological infrastructure required to treat living beings as raw material for labor extraction does not stay neatly contained on one side of that line. It is available for redeployment whenever political conditions shift.[12] The link between animal exploitation and human oppression is not merely moral. It is structural — and a politics that cannot see this has not yet followed its own logic to its conclusion.

The theses are right that Marxists and animal liberationists need each other. But what both need is not the other's existing programme — it is a framework that starts from the material reality of exploitation and follows the logic wherever it leads, without drawing lines where the analysis becomes uncomfortable. That is what a genuinely materialist anti-speciesism would look like. The 18 Theses open the door to it. I hope this response helps push through it.


The framework sketched here — including the account of class exploitation as labor extracted from living bodies, the concept of meritocratic reasoning, and the analysis of competing solidarities — is developed more fully at beyondmeritocracy.info.

Footnotes (12)
  1. [What Sentience Is For](https://beyondmeritocracy.info/blog/what-sentience-is-for) (section VI) runs the same test on the cross-species political theories the theses mention only in passing or not at all — Nussbaum's capabilities approach, Donaldson and Kymlicka's political membership, Cochrane's sentientist cosmopolitanism, the feminist care tradition — and finds that none develops a class analysis of why animal needs go systematically unmet; the care tradition's animal-ethics strand comes nearest, sharing the Marxist critique of capitalist industrialism without the account of why the arrangements persist.

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  2. The distinction, and the broiler as the case where the two questions come apart, is drawn in [Living and Nonliving](https://beyondmeritocracy.info/blog/living-and-nonliving): the energy/labor line sorts what is extracted, while whether an arrangement parallels human class relations turns on whether it is ongoing and directs a living body's activity on terms it does not set. Bred Into Existence treats the broiler as exploited through the property relation, and the breeder hen behind it as the site of reproductive labor. The six weeks are the contract grow-out cycle Christopher Leonard describes in The Meat Racket, 18.

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  3. The needs concept doing the work here is developed in [What Sentience Is For](https://beyondmeritocracy.info/blog/what-sentience-is-for), which sets out the generative principle behind it — where the biological architecture is homologous the need-dimensions are shared, while the strategies for meeting them are species-specific, so the profile is species-specific in content and universal in form — and the evidence that reads the frustration off the pathology (the sow bar-bites, the caged animal paces; at onset, the form of the stereotypy indexes which need was blocked). It also states the consistency test this letter's closing argument relies on: a grounding that is biological cannot be species-specific to Homo sapiens without being a disguised appeal to human specialness.

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  4. This is the argument of [Bred Into Existence: Reproduction, Property and Class Rule](https://beyondmeritocracy.info/blog/bred-into-existence-animal-exploitation-and-the-reproduction-of-class-rule), which develops the social-reproduction case in full — dairy, laying, and breeding animals as variable capital producing surplus value — and the McNally demonstration for enslaved labor that it parallels.

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  5. The distinction is drawn in the companion essay What the Herd Bought (forthcoming), which also finds that a herd kept by its owners' own household sets households apart in wealth without making a class; it becomes class property when others' labor keeps it.

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  6. [Bred Into Existence](https://beyondmeritocracy.info/blog/bred-into-existence-animal-exploitation-and-the-reproduction-of-class-rule) makes the parallel point about capitalism's own place in that history: animal bodies were reshaped for human use over millennia of domestication before capital took hold of them, and what distinguishes the capitalist form is not that bodies are reshaped but the social relation under which the reshaping occurs, its scale, and the severing of genetics from the individual body.

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  7. The Soviet case — primitive accumulation, the tempo of industrialization and what the energy base allowed — is examined in [Living and Nonliving](https://beyondmeritocracy.info/blog/living-and-nonliving), section 2.

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  8. The limit-case argument is made at length in [Where the Logic Is Most Complete: Animal Use and Meritocratic Reasoning](https://beyondmeritocracy.info/blog/where-the-logic-is-most-complete-animal-use-and-meritocratic-reasoning), which takes the justification battery people reach for when challenged on their animal use — taxonomized in the psychological literature as the "4Ns": natural, necessary, normal, nice — and shows that each presupposes the irrelevance of animal experience in order to conclude it; a second circle, in categories the exploiter made, is the same move a line of ostensibly Marxist readings made about chattel slavery. Read with the developmental and motivated-reasoning evidence, the battery's regularity points to a socially reproduced rationalization structure rather than independent moral reasoning. It also draws the practical consequence this letter leaves implicit: whoever rejects meritocratic reasoning in principle should stop using and harming other animals.

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  9. The refusals, and what they lack, are set out in [What Sentience Is For](https://beyondmeritocracy.info/blog/what-sentience-is-for) (section V, "Resistance as evidence"); [Bred Into Existence](https://beyondmeritocracy.info/blog/bred-into-existence-animal-exploitation-and-the-reproduction-of-class-rule) argues that of the two absences — organized resistance that raises costs, and an addressee for the refusals animals do give — the missing addressee is the operative one.

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  10. This mechanism is worked out in [Just Doing Our Jobs: What We Do for a Living](https://beyondmeritocracy.info/blog/on-personal-responsibility-and-careerism), which reads Pachirat's slaughterhouse ethnography for it: a kill floor of more than 800 workers across 121 distinct jobs, of which exactly one — the knocker — delivers the blow that renders the animal unconscious, so the other 120 can say "only the knocker." What distinguishes a moral shield from an ordinary division of labor is exceedance-of-throughput: fragmentation carrying features that go beyond what production requires and are kept despite their cost. That is what makes the compartmentalization an institutional product rather than a personal failing — and why appeals addressed to the individual inside the role so reliably fail.

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  11. The account of why competing solidarities win is [Why Competing Solidarities Tend to Win](https://beyondmeritocracy.info/blog/why-competing-solidarities-tend-to-win): national, religious and communal formations address subsistence, protection, identity and belonging together, where class organizing as typically constructed has addressed a narrower band; and their institutions are tolerated or subsidized by the state, while class organizing works under permanent threat.

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  12. [Bred Into Existence](https://beyondmeritocracy.info/blog/bred-into-existence-animal-exploitation-and-the-reproduction-of-class-rule) traces one such redeployment: Atlantic slavery drew on the reproductive-control toolkit built on animal bodies — managing fertility for increase, separating mothers from young, owning offspring from birth — though ownership of a slave mother's issue was older than that deployment and needed no herd.

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