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Beyond Meritocracy
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More to Lose Than Our Chains: Class Rule and the Problem of Worker Ambivalence

The Problem

For roughly 150 years, the socialist and communist left has organized around one foundational assumption: that our proximate fight is with capitalism. I believe this assumption is wrong, and that it explains much of our failure.

Our fight is with class rule — the broader system of institutionalized relationships through which some people get others to perform labor for them without owing them a return they can hold them to, and in which there are thousands of different ways in which advantage and disadvantage are meted out and expressed. Capitalist wage exploitation is the most widespread and politically important form of this, but it is not the only one. Treating it as though it were has cost us dearly.

The cost shows up in two ways. First, many workers benefit enough from other aspects of class rule, from gendered divisions of labor to professional hierarchies to ethnic and cultural advantages, that they are genuinely ambivalent about abolition. These advantages are tangible, and perceived as natural. Second, many marginalized workers look at the left's promise of "an end to capitalism" and correctly see it as insufficient. It says nothing about the exploitation and marginalization they experience in the private sphere, in their families and communities. So they stay away — not out of apathy, but because the offer isn't good enough.

These two problems (ambivalence among the relatively advantaged, and distrust among the marginalized) are connected. Both stem from a definition of class that is too narrow: one that focuses on wage labor and ownership of the means of production while ignoring the many other ways class rule reproduces itself. But there is a third problem, less visible than either: the relational substrate on which collective action historically depended has been progressively destroyed. The open-ended mutual obligation of communal sharing and equality matching — the mode in which solidarity is practiced, not merely endorsed — has been trained out of daily life wherever provision people once organized together came to arrive without them: by market purchase, whose settlement closes the account, and by administrative provision, which delivers the benefit without the weekly meeting. This destruction is recent in a precise sense: through the first century and a half of proletarianization the substrate went on being replenished from a still partly non-commodified social life, so organizational capacity rose — the ascending labor movement the classical expectation reads correctly. In the core it turns down where the inherited substrate is exhausted and the commodification sequence's later stages add debt-based binding on top; "Not Stages but Depths" argues that the crossover is locatable, which is why the problem is a feature of the present rather than a permanent condition of class society. Even workers who are neither ambivalent nor distrustful face a relational-mode problem: the mode solidarity requires feels unfamiliar, because their daily experience has been organized around transactions that close upon settlement rather than relationships that sustain through ongoing obligation.

If this diagnosis is right, it has major consequences for how we organize — consequences that go well beyond choosing better demands or better messaging. It requires rethinking what workers' organizations are for — and recognizing that organizational capacity must be distributed broadly enough through a population to survive targeting (section 5 sets out why), not concentrated in an identifiable cadre that can be destroyed.[1]

1. Capitalist Class Societies Are Maturing, Not Declining

For well over a century, most of the left has repeated some version of the claim that capitalism is "in decline."[2] This has encouraged wishful thinking and complacency in equal measure. The working class certainly made serious attempts to overthrow capitalist rule in the past century, and came closer than most people now realize. But those attempts failed, and the organizations and splinter factions that survived have done far too little to analyze why they failed — preferring, in most cases, to keep waiting for the next crisis to do the work for them. Our base assumption should be that capitalist class societies are still maturing, and that the ruling classes have spent the past century getting much better at absorbing and neutralizing challenges to their rule.

Consider the broad trajectory. From the late nineteenth century onward, and with increasing force after 1917, mass organizing and the existence of a socialist movement with state power generated enormous pressure on ruling classes to make concessions.[3] Workers' organizations built mutual aid networks, cooperative housing, educational institutions, and health funds; states, under pressure, expanded public provision — social safety nets, public transportation, affordable housing, universal education — partly as genuine concessions, partly to channel demands into forms they could control. These gains strengthened the working class and made it easier to refuse unsafe and particularly exploitative conditions. For decades, the propertied classes could do little about this — the class was too well-organized, and an unprecedented economic boom (fueled by postwar reconstruction and cheap energy) underwrote its confidence.

But the ruling classes were learning, and the benefits were unevenly distributed in ways that undermined our projects from the start. Even during the boom years, they made inroads. To use the postwar US case as an example, the New Deal and GI Bills enforced racial and spatial segregation by design. The CIO tried and expelled eleven unions as Communist-dominated.[4] Management pushed working-class women out of their wartime jobs, and the unions did not consistently defend them (section 2 returns to the case). And the very success of social-democratic reforms generated new tools for class rule. Managing welfare states forced bourgeoisies to build enormous legal-regulatory apparatuses, which in turn spread and normalized capitalist relations of production, created a new stratum of professional and managerial workers with expectations of social advancement, and increased public dependence on the bourgeois state.[5]

The result was not decline but consolidation. By the time the postwar boom ended (through a convergence of economic pressures — industrial competition, the oil crises — and political defeats — the Sino-Soviet split, the failure of 1968)[6] the ruling classes had the tools and experience to roll back earlier gains. From the late 1970s onward, they privatized, marketized, and destroyed or neutered the very organizations that had been built on a class-collaborationist basis. The working class, meanwhile, had grown dependent on state provision and had largely dismantled its own independent organizations, or failed to prevent the undermining of those that remained.

A defender of the decline thesis might respond: isn't the need for increasingly elaborate mechanisms of adaptation itself evidence of decline? A system that requires ever-larger regulatory apparatuses, financialization, and the constant reorganization of class relations just to reproduce itself is hardly thriving. There is something to this. I have no particular quarrel with the observation that capitalist reproduction has become more complex and costly over time.

My quarrel is with the political conclusion that typically follows: that this complexity itself presages collapse, or that the contradictions will eventually force unity. This version of the decline thesis — the one that waits on crisis rather than organizing for it — has substituted prophecy for strategy for over a century, and encourages the left to wait for conditions to do the work that only organizing can do.

"Maturing" is meant to be falsifiable in the same way I demand of the decline thesis, not a reading that absorbs every outcome: a gain counts as recuperated when what it did for the class's capacity to refuse — the members it held, the coverage it gave, the buffer it put under what a strike risks — is reversed or repriced, or comes to rest on administering the concession; it counts as durable where that capacity survives the attempts to reprice it. The claim would be wrong if durable gains of that kind accumulated, or if, within a given configuration, the interval between a gain and its repricing were lengthening rather than shortening. It is a mechanism-level claim in the imperial forms framework's sense, one that can fail this way, not a claim about the framework's generative architecture, which is appraised against leaner alternatives. The strongest candidate counter-case is the Nordic union-administered unemployment insurance discussed below, and it is under test now: Sweden repriced it from 2007, and the blue-collar confederation LO lost 16 percent of its members in three years.[7] And it is not the claim that every concession was hollow — some genuinely strengthened the class, as the boom-era gains above did. It is that the ruling classes grew steadily better at converting even their defeats into instruments of control, so that the balance across the century ran toward consolidation.

This does not mean the system faces no limits. The ecological feedback loop — fossil fuel depletion, agricultural land degradation, biodiversity loss — is degrading the material base on which class rule's reproduction depends. The rising energy cost of extracting degraded fossil deposits, together with ecological degradation, is physically contracting the surplus available for distribution — a contraction technology can defer but not eliminate. Class rule is maturing politically while its material basis deteriorates. But the political maturation and the material contraction are not the same process, and the latter does not cancel the former. A system that is simultaneously more resilient to political challenges and less materially sustainable is more dangerous, not less. The response to material contraction, absent organized alternatives, is not collapse so much as — in the first instance — the intensified exploitation of living bodies: longer hours, worse conditions, expanded coercion, the displacement of ecological costs onto those least able to resist. Living and non-living energy substitute for each other in the labor a system requires — the latter only through the machines built to apply it — so a shortfall in concentrated energy, or in those machines, raises the draw on living bodies, and those with the power to intensify exploitation will do so rather than accept privation. That this compensation cannot indefinitely close the gap is why disorderly breakdown is displaced rather than foreclosed.[8]

The forthcoming companion essay "Not Stages but Depths" develops this argument structurally, showing through a six-stage commodification sequence that the pattern sketched above through the US case operates wherever the sequence has advanced: challenges are absorbed through form-switching and resistance metabolized through institutional adaptation, and the system becomes simultaneously more politically resilient and more materially fragile — a combination that holds across core-country welfare states, peripheral states under structural adjustment, and the financialized global architecture alike.

The strategic conclusion is the same either way: we need to build now, on the terrain that actually exists, rather than on the terrain we hope a future crisis will create.

2. Class Rule Beyond the Wage Relation

The consequences of the narrow definition of class are not only strategic but analytical.

The postwar test case

Take the postwar United States again. The combination of the draft, ongoing military occupations, and expanded access to tertiary education meant very few men were unemployed. During the war itself, millions of women had worked in factories. Unionization rates were high. Workers were in an exceptionally strong bargaining position.[9]

And yet, after the war, women were pushed out of the higher-paid "men's jobs" they had held during it and into lower-paid, sex-typed work — a reconstruction of the prewar sexual division of labor that management led, that unions did not consistently resist, and that a cross-class coalition of husbands and prospective fathers welcomed.[10]

A purely capitalist economic framework explains part of this, though not through direct cost. On Milkman's reckoning, management should on direct costs have kept women, whose labor remained cheaper even after the wartime equal-pay fights; she explains the purge by the sex-typing traditions of the auto and electrical industries and by management's judgment that reorganizing the sexual division of labor "could precipitate widespread resistance" from labor, with the unions at the peak of their strength (pp. 122–26). What it does not explain is why male unionists did not consistently defend women's seniority even where doing so cost the class bargaining power. Part of the answer is labor-market closure: some locals voted to restrict married women's seniority as a brake on substituting cheaper female labor for their own. But closure explains the defense of jobs, not the shape the settlement took in the household. There my reading, which goes beyond Milkman's, is that men also wanted access to use values on terms no market offers: domestic labor, care, sexual availability, and social deference, supplied without payment, on demand, and as a personal bond rather than a purchase.[11] The interests converged, and the record does not let any one of them be isolated: management's sex-typing tradition, male workers' closure and the household demand all predict the persistence of sex-typing that followed, as women's paid employment passed its wartime peak by the early 1950s, in electrical manufacturing only in women's jobs and in auto largely outside the industry.

A recurring pattern

This was not an anomaly. Offering working-class men private dominion over women is a recurring technique of class rule — but the cases divide, and the division matters. In the postwar US the dominion was an offer taken up from below; fascist movements made a similar offer, promising the men they mobilized the restoration of male authority over women and the household, though their regimes also worked against the traditional family.[12] Nineteenth-century France is the opposite case — dominion imposed from above against resistance: the Napoleonic Code left wives under their husbands' authority and children under their fathers', and bourgeois reformers constructed gendered household authority as a deliberate strategy of labor discipline (housing design, moral surveillance, the wife's domestic role), against a working class in which, by region, between a third and a half of couples lived together without marrying.[13] Together the cases show the technique is available to class rule but not automatically effective: it binds where it is wanted from below and must be enforced where it is not. A related technique runs into the present by a different route: not an offer of dominion to the class's men, but the devaluation of its women and the division that follows. Sex tourism — built on tourism that lenders and states promoted as "development," and on a sexual trade that host governments left largely unsuppressed, that some officials encouraged, and that local authorities licensed and taxed — makes a country's women and children available to foreign buyers, alongside its own men or in place of them. That spares working-class solidarity nothing, and may cost it more. The trade runs on the women's devaluation: they carry the stigma patriarchal households attach to women's sex outside marriage, and a trade kept illegal and unorganized leaves them unprotected. That stigma is material for residents' campaigns that sometimes turn to vigilante violence, and the exposure invites violence against the women; both divide the class they belong to.[14]

But the privatized household has a second form of bottom-up pull that most analyses understate: parental authority over children — control over their labor, time, development, and social world — combined with an aspirational stake in the child as vehicle for class reproduction. The authority is a domain of unaccountable power that collectively governed child-rearing would distribute and subject to accountability.[15] The aspiration — the child as carrier of name, status, property, legacy — gives the authority its content, and its weight varies with property values. The care this produces is genuine; what counts as a good future for the child is class-determined. Together, authority and aspiration give both parents a stake in the privatized family form, not only men. The gendered dimension binds men; the parental dimension binds everyone who has children. Together they make the family resilient from below as well as from above.

The pattern is consistent: wherever class rule faces pressure, available responses include offering men from the subordinate classes private dominion over women as compensation for their public subordination, and granting both parents authority over dependents and an aspirational stake in their children's class trajectory. These work because they deliver private, intimate dominion whose value would be corroded by being openly priced — experienced as personal rather than political — and which an ordinary market transaction cannot supply even where a market for parts of it exists. It is class rule operating through the private sphere, and no framework that restricts "class" to wage relations and treats the household as auxiliary to production can see it.[16][17]

A broader definition

I propose that class relations are those that allow a dominant party to get others to do work on terms they set, on an ongoing basis, without owing them a return they can hold them to.[18]

A natural objection: isn't this too broad? After all, many relationships involve asymmetric effort, from friendships to family bonds to casual social obligations. What distinguishes a class relation from an ordinary social asymmetry?

The answer is institutionalized power. Class relations are not simply cases where someone gives more than they get. They are relationships in which the asymmetry is backed by institutional, economic, or social power that the subordinate party cannot easily escape, and that structures their options going forward. A husband who can have his wife committed, fired, or left destitute if she refuses domestic labor is in a class relation with her. A friend who freeloads on your hospitality is not — unless your social world is structured such that refusing him carries real consequences.[19] The key is whether that absence of a return the others can hold them to is enforced and reproduced by arrangements that extend beyond the dyad: legal systems, property relations, organizational hierarchies, cultural norms backed by social exclusion or violence. The sharper test is exit cost across a need-domain: the asymmetry is a class relation when the subordinate cannot withdraw from it without losing access to something they materially need — livelihood, legal standing, safety, shelter — not merely without incurring social awkwardness. That is what places the committed-or-destitute wife inside the definition and the freeloaded-upon friend outside it, while still catching the cases where informal enforcement is severe enough to foreclose exit.

"Work" here includes not just commodity production or paid service, but care, domestic labor, emotional and sexual labor, deference, and institutional compliance where it is effortful activity performed for the holder's benefit. But the definition is not unlimited. It excludes purely personal dynamics that lack institutional backing, even when those dynamics are exploitative in colloquial terms.

In capitalist societies, the politically primary form of this is control over the labor of others through ownership of the means of production: the ability to privatize gains, direct revenues, and compel workers to further an owner's goals. But production and sale are not the only sources of use values that matter to people. There are many others that don't involve markets or wage relations at all. Family life, friendships, sexual and romantic relationships, the maintenance of households and communities — all of these require labor. Much of that labor cannot be had on the terms people want it through a market — not because the tasks could not be sold, but because people don't want to obtain everything that matters to them through the market.[20]

What follows from this? Since institutionalized power asymmetries make it possible to obtain these without owing a return anyone can hold them to, many will seek to do so, and the arrangement selects for those who do. Any arrangement that allows this can become a class-societal benefit, a material stake in its maintenance.[21][22] And the more such arrangements exist, the more normal the whole thing feels.

How non-market exploitation is maintained

Since these use values can't be obtained on these terms through an employment contract, the coercion works differently: the four mechanisms below are the ones available where no contract compels, though they discipline paid labor too. Four mechanisms stand out:[23]

Devaluation of labor. Certain kinds of work (domestic labor, care for children and the elderly, emotional support) are culturally coded as duties, as expressions of love, or as not-really-work. This tends to hide it as exploitation, often even from those performing it.[24]

Devaluation of persons. The people who do this work are dehumanized or assigned lower status — through "scientific" justifications, through religious and cultural norms, through simple habituation to disrespect. In the extreme, their exploitation is defined as not-exploitation because they are defined as not-fully-human.

Coercive enforcement. Direct and indirect violence (state violence, economic exclusion, social ostracism) sets the floor. It establishes what happens to those who refuse, which disciplines everyone else. The firing of married women,[25] the criminalization of poverty, the breaking of strikes: all of these affect what people can demand for their labor, both paid and unpaid.

Artificial scarcity. Restricting access to valued goods and positions — housing, credentials, secure employment, leisure, healthcare, cultural goods — tends to make workers compete laterally for what's available rather than challenging the restrictions themselves.[26] For those within reach of what is scarce, the more desirable things are kept scarce, the more people invest in the hierarchies that distribute them (for those with no realistic prospect of reaching them, the binding loosens instead; see the cost ratchet below), and the more they resent those who seem to be getting something for nothing. This turns the defense of inequality into a felt moral conviction: if I had to compete for this, why shouldn't you? Scarcity doesn't just constrain choices; it trains people to see competitive allocation as fair.

These four mechanisms are not applied uniformly. They operate through what I elsewhere called the incorporation gradient: the continuum from full membership in a society's "national project" (or its organizational, professional, or communal equivalent) down to complete exclusion. Where someone sits on this gradient — determined by some combination of gender, ethnicity, legal status, credentials, confession, and class markers — determines how much of each mechanism they are subjected to, and how much violence can be deployed against them before it generates political consequences for the people doing it. Credentialed metropolitan citizens sit near the top; undocumented migrant workers sit near the bottom; and the distance between them is maintained not by any single sorting criterion but by whichever markers are locally available and institutionally enforceable.

The gradient is not merely inherited from pre-existing prejudice — it is actively manufactured, through legal architecture and through the everyday sorting work of organizations and social groups. Immigration law produces populations that are physically present but legally vulnerable; criminal law does the same to domestic populations (the criminalization of vagrancy converting the dispossessed into a legally targetable labor force is the best-documented early instance; felon disenfranchisement and post-release conditions are contemporary ones). Employers, unions, professional associations, religious bodies, and kinship networks do the rest — hiring selectively, excluding historically, gatekeeping credentials, enforcing conformity, routing opportunities along familiar lines. The border is not only a barrier to labor mobility; it is also a tool for calibrating the degree of legal vulnerability under which a labor force operates; organizational sorting calibrates the rest.[27]

The gradient explains why the same class society produces different forms of class-societal benefit for workers at different positions on it. The form — racial wage in one context, credential gatekeeping in another, patriarchal compensation in a third — varies with gradient position, but the mechanism is the same: relative advantage over those below, defended in proportion to its precariousness. This is why attempts to address one form of hierarchy (say, racial) without addressing the gradient itself tend to redirect the sorting: the fractions the sorting serves concede one axis and recalibrate through others — a first instance of the form-switching developed in section 3.

These four mechanisms are also maintained through socialization. Family dynamics across all class positions teach children to accept non-reciprocal relationships as normal — not only through authoritarian discipline but, as "The Conditions of Care" at beyondmeritocracy.info develops, through the evaluative shift, which that essay finds installed most thoroughly not by strict discipline but by the explain-and-negotiate mode: the process by which responsiveness to what someone needs is replaced by evaluation of what they are doing, installing the disposition to rank persons that class-structured institutional life requires. Schools teach deference to institutional authority. Ethnic chauvinism and patriotism channel ingroup solidarity into support for ruling-class projects, up to and including wars.[28]

Europe's postwar "guest worker" programs are a case in point: millions of workers were recruited to meet labor shortages, and in Castles and Kosack's account the fear of competition fed a prejudice among domestic workers that split the working class — a division that weakened local labor power and that held back unskilled wages, and possibly the general wage rate.[29]

Because binding operates through socialization and daily practice, not just through the provision of material goods, alternatives that merely replace one provider with another do not break it. A welfare state that delivers healthcare, education, and pensions bureaucratically does real work — decommodification lowers workers' dependence on any single employer and, as the boom-era gains showed, raises their capacity to refuse. But it does not by itself rebuild the collectively governed practice that class rule disrupted, and its characteristic risk is that dependence shifts from employer to state while the habits of deference remain intact — recipients rather than participants — and provision that arrives without participation consumes the relational substrate by a route other than the market's. What actually erodes the binding is collective self-organization that addresses the same domains through shared practice: mutual aid that requires participation, not just eligibility; childcare that is collectively governed, not just provided; political education that develops pattern recognition through experience rather than instruction from above. The distinction is between breadth (how many domains an alternative addresses) and depth (whether it does so through practice that rebuilds self-directed activity or through provision that reproduces dependence in a new form). Breadth without depth risks replacing one set of masters with another.

Organizational use values

There is a third domain, besides the market and the private sphere, where class relations operate: within organizations themselves.

Managers measure their standing by the number of people who work under them. Tenured professors build careers on the labor of adjuncts and doctoral students. Bureaucrats derive status and security from controlling access to services. None of these people own the means of production. But all of them derive use values from the positions they hold — use values that give them a concrete, material interest in the perpetuation of hierarchy.[30]

The more such positions exist, the more people have a stake in class rule that goes beyond their wage. The simple dichotomy between "owners" and "workers" was never adequate, but it has become less useful still as capitalist societies matured and proliferated organizational hierarchies.

Class position as the sum of interests

All of this implies that a person's class position is not adequately captured by whether they own the means of production, or even by their relationship to surplus value. It is better understood as the sum of their interests in maintaining class rule: in the market, in the private sphere, in organizational life, and in the many overlaps between these.[31]

A fourth stake has been mass-produced as collective provision degraded, and the withdrawal of that provision manufactures it directly. As defined-benefit pensions, public housing, and social insurance are converted into individually held market positions — home equity, the retirement portfolio, the 401(k) — a slice of the wage-dependent household's own balance sheet comes to appreciate only if the system whose wage relation is degrading it keeps functioning. This solders the household's interests to market stability even where its wage interests would counsel disruption: the mortgaged worker with a retirement account has, in the most literal sense, more to lose than their chains. The companion essay "Not Stages but Depths" develops the mechanism — asset-based welfare as a binding force, not merely a stratifying one; what matters here is that it is a class-societal stake like the others: a provision stake, standing in for the collective provision it replaced, but one that does not loosen simply because a collectively governed alternative is built. What binds is the fear that what the household already holds will lose its value, and that fear attaches to the market the asset is priced in, not to any provider. It is the most recent to be built, and it reaches households with no dominion over anyone — though only those that hold assets; the companion records a wide floor below which there is nothing to hold.

The class has more to lose than its chains, and most of its members know this intuitively even when they can't articulate it. Seen whole, that is interdependence turned against those it binds — the cooperative stake in another's survival that is the species baseline, re-signed by class society into a stake in the arrangement that exploits you.

I don't say this to counsel despair — it's actually a precondition for serious organizing, once you accept it. But let me be precise about what I mean by "ambivalence," since this is a strong claim. I am not arguing that workers sit around weighing the pros and cons of class rule. I am arguing something more structural: that many workers hold at once an interest in ending their own exploitation and stakes in the arrangement that exploits them, and that those who occupy positions of relative power, over subordinates, over family members, over less-credentialed or less-protected workers, develop justifications for that power that parallel ruling-class ones.

A characteristic form this takes is the conviction Kant attacked in his essay on "immaturity": that those below you are not yet ready to govern themselves, and that your role as intermediary — manager, bureaucrat, party cadre, head of household — is therefore necessary and benign.[32] This logic is as prevalent among liberal technocrats who believe the public needs expert guidance as it is among Maoists who see the party as the necessary translator of the masses' will into political action. In both cases, the intermediary's position is justified by the claimed incapacity of those they mediate for — a self-serving judgment that is rarely tested and never voluntarily relinquished.

On top of this, there are the more straightforward cases: workers who defend national barriers because these protect their relative advantages, men who resist the equalization of domestic labor, credentialed and craft workers who support gatekeeping that maintains their scarcity premium.[33][34] In none of these cases is "ambivalence" the right word for a conscious deliberation. It is closer to what happens when the stakes in the arrangement and the commitments against it — moral ones, and material ones too, since ending one's own exploitation is a material interest — pull in different directions and the stakes win by default — especially when the prevailing ideology provides ready-made justifications for why they should.

But there is a deeper mechanism than either material interest or ideological justification, and it helps explain why ambivalence is so resilient. Class societies have made hierarchical standing the primary route to experienced agency — to the felt capacity to make decisions, shape one's environment, exercise competence, and matter. People do not need to endorse a hierarchy to compete within it; they need only to be in a situation where their capacity to act runs through it. The result is that hierarchies are played, with rules, advancement markers, improvisation within constraints, and the intrinsic motivation that competitive play generates. Academic credentials, the corporate promotion ladder, organizational rank within religious or political movements, even the informal status hierarchies of neighborhoods and friendship circles — all of these are games whose play-character makes participation self-reinforcing independently of belief in the game's justice. You can think the system is rigged and still invest in climbing it, because the climbing is where agency lives. The discriminating evidence that this is a distinct driver, and not the status interest this essay counts as material, has to be play that continues where no standing follows from it: the employee who keeps optimizing a metric nobody reviews, the volunteer who keeps doing the coordinating work after the title has gone to someone else. Status return predicts that the investment falls off where the standing cannot be seen or converted; experienced agency predicts that it continues. Where both are present, as in an academic prestige economy, the two cannot be told apart, and the claim is only that they are two things.

When an existing status hierarchy erodes — corporatist welfare institutions, industrial-era occupational identity, colonial racial privilege — what has been lost is not only material provision or ideological certainty but avenues for experienced agency. This is one structural reason reactionary movements tend to grow when existing hierarchies collapse: they offer new status games, new avenues for experienced power, in circumstances where the old ones have been dismantled.[35]

These stratifications are not static. Because capitalist production is constantly being reorganized (through technological change, shifts in demand, the creation of new industries and the destruction of old ones) there are always fresh opportunities for workers in specific sectors to improve their position by acquiring the right skills or entering the right field at the right time. Programmers, for instance, have commanded high wages for decades despite being almost entirely unorganized, simply because their labor remained scarce relative to demand, which in Wright's terms is a "skill rent."[36] Some become consultants; a few, with access to capital and the right niche, become capitalists outright — a trajectory actively encouraged by stock-based compensation. The orthodox expectation that proletarianization will eventually flatten these distinctions and produce easy unity is therefore structurally wrong: capitalist dynamism constantly regenerates intra-class stratification even as it dissolves specific instances of it. There is no plateau at which the class will have been sufficiently homogenized for unity to become straightforward.[37]

Without organizational practices that address these dynamics rather than wishing them away, calls for "unity" will continue to ring hollow.

3. The PMC Debate as Case Study

The recurring debate over the "professional-managerial class" illustrates what happens when the left tries to grapple with intra-class stratification using analytical tools that weren't built for it. The narrow toolkit fails the debate in two ways at once: it reads the stratum's growth as an index of capital's retreat, and it reads the stratum's power over other workers as evidence of a separate "class." The two failures map onto the two disputes below.

The debate is older than its left variants suggest. Its original formulation belongs to James Burnham, the ex-Trotskyist turned conservative who argued in The Managerial Revolution (1941) that managers were becoming a new ruling class displacing the bourgeoisie; he later became a senior editor of National Review from its founding. That a reactionary and left contributors to the same debate both read the growth of a managerial stratum as an index of bourgeois control's displacement — Burnham as a triumphant new ruling class, the left decline-theorists as capital's crisis, opposite valences reaching the same structural inference — should direct attention to the premise they share: that managerial or professional growth registers capital's retreat. That premise is the one Dispute 1 below refutes. Convergence from opposite directions is not itself the objection; it locates where the objection has to bite.[38][39]

On the left, the debate has surfaced in roughly the same form three times: in the 1970s, when the Ehrenreichs identified a growing stratum of salaried mental workers, the bulk of a "middle-class" left, whose dealings with the working class mixed contempt and paternalism[40]; after the New Left's collapse, when it went dormant; and again after Bernie Sanders' first presidential campaign, when a new generation sought to explain the passionate hostility of progressive, middle-class voters to his program. Catherine Liu's Virtue Hoarders is a recent contribution. Mike Macnair reviewed it for the Weekly Worker , criticizing her use of "class" while offering an analysis that I think reproduces the core problem in a different form.[41]

The debate keeps recurring — and keeps failing to resolve — because it involves two analytical disputes that the standard framework can't settle.

Dispute 1: Does the growth of "the PMC" signal capitalist decline?

Macnair argues that it does. In his view the "rise of the PMC" is "a particular form" of a trend found in the decline of any class order: "the self-ordering capacity of the ruling class declines, while the state picks up the slack," and state bureaucracy expands. He adds that this "remains at its core the regime of capitalist state power": the growth is a symptom of decline, not a rival to capital. But the state he describes still competes with capital, since states in class societies are "in competition with the exploiting class for a share of the social surplus product (tax versus rent; tax versus profit)."

I think this gets the relationship between the state and capital backwards. States positioned favorably in the currency hierarchy fund provision through two mechanisms: taxation and endogenous credit creation. The fiscal constraint that makes "state vs. private sector" look zero-sum is, in the richer and politically dominant states and outside conditions of genuine resource or labor scarcity, not a material limitation but a political choice, enforced through the ratchet — Maastricht's fiscal rules, central bank independence, balanced-budget orthodoxy — that forecloses it independently of the tax regime (the imperial forms framework develops this in the welfare-circuit section).[42] Under those conditions state demand generally stimulates private-sector growth rather than displacing it.

The advent of neoliberal public-private partnerships has gone further — reorganizing the state so that public expenditure directly constitutes private accumulation. The de-risking state absorbs downside risk through PPP guarantees and market-maker-of-last-resort operations while investors' cash flows are protected (Gabor's "Wall Street Consensus," her account of development finance in the global South). Growth of the state apparatus does not come at the expense of the private sector; it extends the terrain on which capitalist relations of production operate.

On Macnair's account decline comes first and bureaucratic growth follows, as the state takes up what a weakening ruling class can no longer order for itself. The postwar expansion of credentialed employment did not take up slack left by a weakening bourgeoisie; it produced a stratum that divides, and one of its fractions helped dismantle the welfare settlement. On the survey evidence the line runs by the kind of work rather than by sector: in northern and western Europe, managers and technical experts sit to the right of production workers on market liberalism even net of education and income, routine clerical staff — the rank and file of the administrative apparatus — about halfway between, and sociocultural professionals, the teachers and nurses who staff the provision, at or near the level of production workers (a weak rightward lean in continental Europe only); in Southern Europe class has little effect.[43] The managerial fraction supplied a constituency for the dismantling, not its whole force: the tax revolts that persuaded politicians the supply-side program had a mandate were homeowners' revolts drawn from all walks of life, and the base for progressive taxation shrank less through any stratum's change of mind than through the left's loss of the case for it, once the wartime conditions that had made the compensatory argument persuasive were gone. That the managerial fraction experiences high marginal rates as penalizing its own earned success — meritocratic reasoning applied reflexively — is this essay's inference; no survey has measured it. Capital did not lose ground to an expanding state; the fraction whose self-understanding rationalized the transfer of surplus from public provision to private accumulation was one of the constituencies that carried it. And the professions themselves — medicine, education, credentialed caring work, financial advising — are the institutional vehicles through which new domains are commodified and drawn into capital's circuits, not held outside them. PMC growth tracks the advance of commodification, not capital's retreat from it — even in the mid-century welfare state, where what was decommodified was access, while the provision beneath it, delivered by salaried professionals with commodity inputs, stayed commodity-based.[44]

The mechanism is recursive. Workers' organizing created the welfare state; administering it required gatekeeping professionals; those professionals acquired stakes in the institutional architecture their positions depended on — credential regimes, advisory roles, intermediary functions — and meritocratic self-understanding justified extending that architecture into adjacent domains rather than constraining it. The companion essay "Not Stages but Depths" formalizes the structural pattern as the commodification sequence; what matters here is the agency dimension: each cohort does not merely occupy the niche the previous stage created but actively generates the institutional conditions for the next. The zero-sum reading of "state" versus "private sector" that Macnair's account builds in cannot survive contact with a process that runs through both simultaneously: the state imposes dependence at the first stage (by dispossession or by capture) and de-risks the financialized product at the last, while professionals administer each transition in between.

Furthermore, when professional and managerial strata wield state power, they typically spread class-societal norms further (through means-testing, criminalization of poverty, privatization of public services, credentialism) rather than challenging the principle of private ownership. The "War on Drugs" and the gutting of welfare through appeals to "fiscal responsibility" are policies that stabilize class rule, not ones that undermine it.[45]

Dispute 2: What is the PMC's relationship to class rule?

Macnair's analysis centers on the state bureaucracy: its officials' pull toward diverting state assets to their own families, and the state ideologies that hold them back. He sees parts of the organizing problem clearly. He insists that the working class needs "the freedom to organise within the organisation and if necessary against the leadership"; he sees bureaucratic divisions of labor growing up even in left groups opposed to them; he notes that the anxiety to keep one's children from ending up lower-status reaches "the upper layers of the working class," which is what let capital "pull off the 'education reform' con-trick"; and he ends on "radical democracy and the subordination of the labour bureaucracy." But he treats that anxiety as a vulnerability capital exploits rather than as a material interest workers hold in class rule, and that interest is the problem that bears directly on organizing.

To the extent "the PMC" shares a common orientation, it is toward facilitating class rule, not toward expropriating or neutralizing the propertied classes. Its members believe in the separation of powers, the sanctity of contracts, the value form, meritocratic selection. At their most radical, they want the state to fund uneconomic services and restrain corruption. Even if they achieved full political dominance, the societies they administered would remain capitalist.[46]

The more important point concerns how this works inside organizations. As I argued in the previous section, the expansion of professional, managerial, and regulatory roles has given a large fraction of waged workers real power over other workers. This doesn't make them a separate "class" in any rigorous sense; most of them work for wages and have no control over the means of production.[47] But it does mean they have material interests in class rule that go beyond their wage: the ability to claim others' work, to control access to resources and services, to derive status from organizational position. The strength of these interests varies with institutional conditions — a department head who controls hiring has different stakes than a frontline supervisor with no discretionary power — but where such positions carry genuine authority over others' prospects, the interests are real.

The proliferation of such roles has two effects. First, it increases mass support for the principle of hierarchical organization, because more people directly benefit from it. Second, it creates real intra-class conflicts (between managers and managed, between credentialed and uncredentialed, between permanent and precarious) that obstruct unification. The ruling classes have learned to use this, even if we haven't: The multiplication of intermediate positions functions as a technique of class rule, whether or not it was designed as such.[48] The fact that something similar happened in the USSR and in most unions (the emergence of entrenched managerial strata that reproduced class dynamics internally) is negative proof that the workers' movement failed to prevent or combat this, though the tendency had been named before the First World War (Michels, Political Parties, 1911).

The intensity of this investment is not uniform across the stratum, and its sharpest expression has a specific material source. The professional and managerial strata reproduce their position differently from the propertied classes: they cannot simply bequeath it. Their standing rests on credentials, which must be re-won each generation through their children's own certified achievement — which is why Barbara Ehrenreich described the inner life of this stratum as a chronic fear of falling, an anxiety built into a position that cannot be transmitted the way property can.[49] One channel for that anxiety is the family: the companion essay "The Conditions of Care" traces how it shapes the anxious, credential-focused, explain-and-negotiate child-rearing that installs meritocratic reasoning in a form harder to locate than overt discipline does. But it also does political work directly. It is discharged downward, as investment in the boundary separating the credentialed from those beneath them, and it gives the stratum's defense of hierarchy an affective charge that a merely calculated interest would not carry. Göran Therborn's concept of alter-ideologies — the ideological side of how a subject relates to its Others — gives the form, and Tutt and Varn's reading of it supplies the content: the professional stratum defines itself downward against the proletarian condition it fears falling into, while borrowing from the class above it a contempt for that condition. The two movements fuse, and the fusion is what turns ordinary status-anxiety reactionary. It also explains a pattern that recurs whenever the stratum is itself proletarianized: as credentialed work is deskilled, casualized, and stripped of its security, the fraction undergoing that descent does not reliably radicalize leftward. Part of it turns on those below with redoubled intensity, because the alter-ideology was organized around avoiding precisely this fate — and avoiding it now means insisting, harder, on the distinction that proletarianization is erasing.[50] The companion essay "Why Nobody Sees the Whole" works this stake through a single domain in detail, where it does discriminating work: it is what separates a disciplinary boundary defended because a jurisdiction depends on it from one whose construction and defense track class function — and without that distinction a class analysis of knowledge production becomes a skeleton key.

Macnair grants that "the will to power over others is relevant to the story," but holds that it "is not deep down enough in the level of the analysis": beneath it lies the material division of labor, and "we do not require the aspiration to power over other individuals to explain mass acquiescence to capitalism." On the first point I agree. Directing others' activity is not a drive people bring to class society but a strategy that class society makes unusually rewarding, since under class conditions no other strategy reaches as many dimensions of need at once. But that is a reason to look harder at the division of labor, not to set power aside, because the division of labor is organized as positions, and many of them carry power over others. Acquiescence is then not only the "dull compulsion of everyday life" he cites; for the people who hold such positions it is also interest. Many workers exercise power over others as a routine feature of their working lives, and many more benefit from class-societal arrangements restricting others' autonomy — over abortion rights, gender expression, behavioral conformity, ethnic hierarchies, or access to housing and education. These are not mere attitudes to be overcome through correct political education. They are material practices embedded in people's daily lives, and they will not disappear after a revolution that addresses only wage exploitation.

Which means that most of the working class will uphold class relations in at least some contexts. "Uphold" here ranges from passive accommodation — complying because the costs of contestation exceed the margin for risk — to active championing of specific hierarchies, with most workers falling somewhere in between depending on the domain. Denying this in the name of "unity" hasn't worked — not in a century of trying.

Patriarchy, racism, and other forms of class exploitation

One further point. While Engels is likely right that some form of patriarchal rule was the first type of class exploitation affecting humans,[51] I don't think it useful to treat any specific division of labor as "substructural to class," as Macnair tentatively suggests the gender division of labor "may, in turn, be." There is something to the suggestion: patriarchal exploitation predates capitalism, so it has dynamics not reducible to the wage relation — and Macnair himself holds that capitalism "contains and requires regimes of personal subordination at its core." But priority-in-time and non-reducibility do not make it substructural — a separate foundation the capitalist economy rests on. They make it an older instance of the same logic of institutionalized taking in which those taken from cannot hold the taker to any return, which is why the two interlock rather than layer, and what earns the claim is not the definition alone but how the two trade against each other: class rule buys off pressure on one with dominion in the other (the compensation pattern above), and form-switching (below) conserves the same taking across institutional forms.

The exploitation of women and children is not a residual pre-capitalist formation. It is another form of class exploitation — one whose persistence allows the propertied classes to pay women and children less, treat them worse, and divide those who work for a living. The same applies to ethnic and other forms of exploitation. And since capitalist development constantly creates new forms of marginalization and new populations to be proletarianized, treating each one as a separate "issue" results in playing whack-a-mole. What's needed is an analysis that recognizes them all as expressions of the same underlying logic — which is what the broader definition of class relations proposed here is meant to provide.[52] And the unified definition derives from a single mechanism a regularity that an account of separate, interacting systems can only record case by case — single-axis remedies push harm onto the uncontested axis: when organized resistance raises the cost of exploitation along one channel, the fractions whose extraction it disrupts redirect it, by deliberate counter-organization, through channels the resistance left uncontested. Abolition destroyed legal ownership of persons; within two decades, convict leasing and debt peonage reconstituted racialized exploitation through different institutional forms. Decolonization ended direct colonial administration; extraction was redirected through conditionality mechanisms the Bretton Woods institutions had already been developing. This is form-switching. It is not automatic: each switch took fractions with the access to build the new channel, and each succeeded because the resistance, organized on a partial solidarity, left other channels uncontested. What the single logic adds is the identification: the convict lease and the conditionality program are the same taking in new institutional forms, which is why ending one form does not end it.

4. Meritocratic Reasoning

Meritocratic reasoning is the ideological mechanism that operates across all these forms of class exploitation. It is distinct from meritocracy as a state ideology or as a set of institutional practices (credentialism, standardized testing, competitive selection). Meritocratic reasoning is something more fundamental: it is the generative logic through which any form of class exploitation — feudal, patriarchal, colonial, bureaucratic, capitalist — is rationalized and made to seem natural.[53]

The logic has two formulations, one positive and one negative. The positive — "those who are or do better deserve more" — sounds almost unobjectionable, which is why most people accept it without scrutiny. But it is inseparable from its corollary: "those who are or do worse deserve less." Together they produce a circular justificatory structure. People who are "found wanting" — because woman, because poor, because migrant, because disabled, because insufficiently credentialed — are said to owe their subordinate position to themselves. Their exploitation is reframed as a consequence of their own deficiency. The circle closes when the structural conditions that produce the deficiency are treated as evidence that the deficiency is real. This downward attribution is the same operation that, in the professional strata, the fear of falling charges with particular intensity: the alter-ideology and the negative corollary are one mechanism seen from two angles — motive and justificatory form.

This is not a feature specific to capitalism, or even to modernity. What changes across contexts is the specific content — which groups are found wanting, which deficiencies are cited, which institutions enforce the judgment — while the downward-attributing form stays constant. That form is homologous rather than identical across contexts: in achieved-status orders (meritocracy proper) the circularity is sharp, the structural conditions that produce the deficiency read back as evidence that it is real; ascribed-status orders (feudal blood, fixed estates) attribute the deficiency to nature rather than deriving it from performance, so the same family of desert-reasoning runs a different circular route — and deriving it from performance is what makes capitalist legitimation, as the next pages argue, hard to contest. What is constant is the operation of attributing subordinate position to the subordinate's own deficiency, and because it is so general, it can be applied to new groups and new forms of exploitation as they emerge, which is why the principle of class rule is so resilient in the face of challenges to any particular form of domination. Abolish one justification and the same reasoning structure generates another.

Two related arguments identify adjacent phenomena. Gramsci's concept of hegemony identifies the fact that ruling-class values are naturalized — that domination is maintained through consent as much as coercion — and locates the naturalization in what he calls the ideological structure of a ruling class — the press above all, but also libraries, schools, associations, the church — and the production of common sense.[54] Bourdieu's symbolic violence comes closer. He finds the misrecognized, euphemized form of domination in pre-capitalist debt and gift, locates the struggle over its recognition among age groups, the sexes and social classes, and in schooling he names a "charismatic (or meritocratic) ideology" that explains unequal access to qualifications by unequal innate "gifts" — the circular attribution itself, inside one institution.[55] His account of how objective mechanisms come to make that ideological work superfluous is close to the endogenous generation described below. What this essay adds is the claim that this one form — the attribution of subordinate position to the subordinate's own deficiency — is the common form across all the domains of class exploitation, gendered, ethnic, organizational and economic, with different surface content each time. Hegemony gives the institutional how; meritocratic reasoning gives the formal how.

If the problem were only hegemony, counter-hegemonic culture would suffice. If the problem is a reasoning form, then what's needed is the capacity to recognize the form itself across its many instantiations — which is a different kind of political education.

But meritocratic reasoning, important as it is, is only one of four modes through which class rule secures compliance. (These are modes of compliance — distinct from the four maintenance mechanisms of section 2, which concern how non-market exploitation is enforced.) Two of the four generate the belief that the hierarchy is deserved: meritocratic reasoning supplies the justificatory form, and endogenous generation — developed below — supplies the market's own evidence for it. The other two matter because they explain something the belief-generating modes cannot: why compliance persists even where justificatory belief has broken down.[56]

The second mode is accommodation. People can see the system as unjust and still comply with it, because the costs of contestation — lost wages, lost standing, lost security, lost relationships, sometimes lost safety — exceed what they can bear within the time horizons available to them. Accommodation is not belief, and in this weighed register it is calculation: the arrangement's injustice is recognized, and treated as not worth the personal price of contesting. This mechanism does not require ignorance or ideology; it only requires that the institutional architecture impose sufficient costs on contestation and distribute the benefits of compliance in ways workers cannot afford to forgo. It is why even accurate structural critiques can circulate widely without generating contestation commensurate with their reach: people can agree that the system is rigged and still calculate, rationally, that challenging it exceeds their margin for risk. Accommodation also has an unweighed register, in which nothing is calculated because contesting never becomes a question: the arrangement meets enough of people's needs — through work, family, consumption, leisure, belonging — that what it frustrates does not register as pressing. Both registers rest on the same fact, the range of needs the arrangement meets; they differ in whether the injustice is recognized and priced, or never becomes a question at all.

The third mode is foreclosure. Class rule in stable capitalist societies does not depend on people believing that the hierarchy is just. Foreclosure secures it by preventing them from being able to contest it effectively — through the fragmentation of knowledge into disciplines that cannot see cross-domain connections, through the geographic scatter of dispossession (a privatization here, a debt crisis there, a land grab somewhere else — no single population experiences enough of the pattern to name it), through credentialism that gates who counts as a legitimate speaker, and through the cognitive separation of the zone where accumulation operates from the zone where liberal commitments apply. Most people do not need to believe the arrangement is just. They need only to lack the analytical tools or political standing to contest it effectively. This is why accommodation and foreclosure can sustain class rule where it is stable, whatever people believe — the evidence being the one named just above, that accurate structural critiques circulate widely without generating contestation commensurate with their reach, because what circulates is the critique of one domain at a time, not the connections between them (the cross-domain task below) — a point the left has been slow to grasp because it keeps looking for the ideology to refute.[57]

The fourth mode is endogenous generation: the market supplies the evidence for its own legitimation to people raised to expect that society rewards effort. The market is formally open, and the hierarchy it offers is not a two-rung ladder from worker to employer but a long gradient: a better-paid post, a credential, a supervisory role over other workers, a house that gains value, a pension that grows, better prospects for one's children. Each step delivers security, standing, time, or comfort that people genuinely care about, and several are the stakes section 2 traced. Because people observably do climb some of these steps, the hierarchy appears to result from differential performance rather than structural position. The statistical reality of some upward mobility gives it an empirical anchor across a whole market-dependent population — the belief in the possibility of advancement is empirically anchored rather than delusional even when advancement is structurally improbable, because observable cases confirm the possibility (if not the odds). This is what makes capitalist legitimation hard to contest: the system does not need priests or ideologues to tell you your place is deserved — its ordinary operations produce the evidence that seems to confirm it, and family and school have already taught you to read that evidence as desert.

In the societies where most of us organize, then, refuting the ideology is necessary but not sufficient. But meritocratic reasoning is also the mode most deeply embedded in daily experience. We absorb it through socialization — through schools that rank and sort, workplaces that reward compliance, and institutions that require us to prove our "worth" in order to access basic goods and services. The more time we spend in such institutions, the more natural the logic feels, and the less likely we are to question the principle that people's needs should be met differentially based on how they are valued by those with institutional power.[58] The structural modes hold compliance in stable capitalist societies without belief, but meritocratic reasoning is what makes them feel like the way things are rather than like arrangements that could be otherwise.

The four modes explain why people don't contest the system — through justification, accommodation, foreclosure, and the market's own evidence. But none of them explains why even people who see through the justification and can bear the costs of contestation still find solidarity difficult to practice. That requires a different mechanism: the system doesn't only raise the costs of contesting — it degrades the relational capacity that collective action depends on. The companion essay "Not Stages but Depths" develops this through what it calls the interaction-mode ecology: the commodification sequence progressively shifts daily life from communal sharing and equality matching (open-ended mutual obligation that is the social bond — buying rounds, unquantified mutual aid, co-presence maintaining relationships that can never be settled up) toward market pricing (ratio commensuration through a common metric, individual maximization, closure upon settlement). What this means for the present argument is that the relational mode collective action requires — open-ended, without a settlement point, the reward being the ongoing relationship rather than any single transaction — is precisely the mode the commodification sequence has been training people against through the ordinary texture of their days. The friendly society's replacement by commercial insurance, the pub by the platform, the chapel network by the podcast — each substitution shifts the ecology, and each is individually rational. So is the other route the companion traces, provision handed to an administration, which delivers the benefit without the participation that sustained the relation. The shift operates not only by substituting a transactional mode for an open-ended one in each domain but by destroying the temporal condition the open-ended mode requires: communal sharing and equality matching need coordinated, co-present, unfragmented time — the hours several people can spend together, regularly and unhurriedly — and that quantity can shrink even as aggregate leisure grows, as desynchronized schedules, lengthening commutes, and the cost ratchet's pull of both parents into wage dependence fragment the time collective life ran on. The binding therefore compounds: the same cost ratchet that binds the household financially also strips it of the time in which solidarity could be rebuilt. The cumulative effect is the destruction of the relational terrain on which collective action could develop.

There is a further mechanism beneath the relational one, and it is the reason the justificatory modes above cannot simply be argued away. The boundary between those who count and those who contaminate is maintained affectively before it is maintained by argument: a pre-reflective recoil — disgust toward the person the gradient has placed at the bottom, deference toward the one it has placed at the top — that fires before any justification is consulted, which is why two centuries of discrediting justifications left it running. The incorporation gradient of section 2 is not only an institutional sorting; it is affectively enforced, and the enforcement does its heaviest work not on the person at the bottom, whom force can already discipline, but on everyone else, in whom disgust makes solidarity across the gradient feel like contamination before it can become a political fact. This is the deeper sense in which refuting the ideology is necessary but not sufficient — the disposition the refutation targets was never installed by argument. Its content varies by population and its installation is uneven, a family resemblance across cases rather than a single substance; but where it operates it seals the self against solidarity while leaving it open to the demands made on it. The companion essay "Matter Out of Place" anatomizes this affective architecture — the property form's taboo-structure — in full; what bears here is that it is why the relational rebuilding the next section calls for cannot be done by better arguments, only by a different kind of experience.

This is not limited to explicitly authoritarian socialization. The companion essay "The Conditions of Care" shows that the evaluative shift — the process by which responsiveness to what someone needs is replaced by evaluation of what they are doing — is not confined to the strict or coercive mode. The education-reproduced stratum's explain-and-negotiate mode installs it in a form harder to locate than authoritarian discipline does, because the child rarely meets coercion as coercion: compliance arrives through a process that engaged the child's comprehension, so it feels like agreement rather than obedience. What the child learns is that authority is legitimate when it explains itself — the refined compliance training that produces people who can't distinguish institutional expectation from personal judgment, who experience class-structured sorting as the natural consequence of their own freely made choices. The avoidant mode trains the experience that expressing need is a gamble — producing either premature self-sufficiency or escalation, both rational responses to unreliable care. The strict mode trains the capacity to suppress need-signals on command. Each mode produces people whose relational habits are shaped toward ranking persons by desert: monitoring what you are owed, calculating the return on engagement, judging others by what they have earned. The evaluative shift is what converts the species-typical capacity for communal sharing and equality matching into that defended orientation, the readiness on which market pricing then draws when it treats relationships as accounts to be settled rather than bonds to be sustained — and it operates through the family before school, workplace, or any institutional socialization reinforces it.[59]

For organizing, this means that contesting class rule requires both: developing the capacity to recognize meritocratic reasoning across its instances (the political-education task), and developing the analytical tools that the system's ignorance production filters out, mostly as a by-product of how knowledge is divided, funded and credentialed rather than by design (the cross-domain task). Workers need to be able to see the same logic operating when a woman is told she's paid less because she "chose" a caring profession; when a migrant is told he deserves worse conditions because he "chose" to come; when a laid-off factory worker is told to "retrain"; and when a community is told it's poor because it lacks "human capital." These are not separate ideological problems. They are instances of a single method of rationalization, and naming it as such is a precondition for building the kind of solidarity that can withstand divide-and-rule. But they also need to be able to see the connections between domains — between the cheap goods in the supermarket and the structural adjustment that cheapened the inputs, between the credential that gates their advancement and the enclosure that destroyed alternative forms of knowledge — and these connections are what the existing organization of knowledge production, divided by discipline and scattered by geography, leaves invisible.

5. What This Means for Organizing

None of this is new. Marginalized and progressive sections of workers' organizations have repeatedly tried to convince the broader movement that ending class rule requires more than fighting wage exploitation. Almost every time, the broader movement ignored, marginalized, or expelled them. Even now, as what remains of the organized left belatedly changes, partly through its own collapse, the integration of these insights is ad hoc, usually justified through liberal language about "diversity and inclusion" rather than as a consequence of class analysis itself.

The source of the problem is clear enough. For over a century, the left has treated workers' organizations as instruments for obtaining state power, with all other questions (gendered exploitation, ethnic divisions, internal democracy, the reproduction of managerial hierarchy within the movement itself) to be addressed afterwards, or to be resolved automatically by the seizure of power.

But if class rule operates across multiple domains, and if many workers have concrete stakes in its perpetuation, then this approach simply doesn't work. It leaves all non-wage forms of class exploitation intact, every intra-class division available as a wedge issue. And it asks workers who benefit from some aspects of class rule to join a movement that neither acknowledges nor confronts those benefits — which is why so many of them don't. By the same narrowness, it says nothing to the marginalized about the exploitation they live in the household and community — the other half of why they stay away. Both costs the introduction named flow from the one too-narrow definition, and broadening it is itself the better offer: a movement that names the advantaged's benefits and confronts the marginalized's private-sphere exploitation is the one that gives the second a reason to trust it, and the first an offer that is credible because it is honest: provision stakes loosen when collectively governed alternatives exist, while dominion stakes, as below, have to be confronted rather than bought off. That approach (roughly "Bolshevik," though it goes back to Marx's time) has had over a century to work. It hasn't.

So what follows?

If class rule binds workers through monopoly over valued goods across multiple domains — wages, but also domestic authority, organizational standing, credential-based status, national-institutional protections — then unbinding requires rebuilding alternatives across those same domains. But the two kinds of stake unbind differently. Provision-dependence stakes (employer healthcare, state pensions) loosen when a collectively governed alternative is built — the worker welcomes it. Dominion stakes — the patriarchal, parental, managerial benefit that is power over others — do not: their holder resists the alternative, so unbinding there means reorganizing the domain under non-asymmetric governance against that resistance, and the stake persists even where the system's foreclosure of self-organization has lifted.

The companion essay on competing solidarities finds that where left organizational infrastructure persists, right-wing solidarities cannot establish themselves. CPI-M areas blocked Hindutva penetration; anarchist barris blocked the Falange. This is consistent with the mechanism this essay predicts, measured on that essay's outcome-independent terms — dimensional coverage, governance form, reproduction conditions — rather than read off the blocking itself. These cases demonstrate defensive success (blocking the right from capturing territory), not the abolition of class rule internally. Organizing works defensively even when depth and internal transformation remain incomplete, which means the two problems are analytically separable.

The specific form unbinding takes is self-organization: not ideological conversion, but the reassertion of collective self-directed activity that class rule exists to deny and undermine. The imperial forms framework essay identifies four mechanisms through which self-organization does this work — reducing dependence on what the system monopolizes, compounding institutional capacity through residue that subsequent cycles inherit, constituting counter-power dense enough to organize reproduction on its own terms, and producing counter-knowledge that contests the system's ignorance production.

This is why, on the imperial forms framework's account, the system targets organizational infrastructure with such specificity: union-busting, surveillance, the assassination of organizers, the criminalization of mutual aid, the destruction of autonomous educational institutions. These are not incidental to class rule but constitutive of it: the stakes that bind through external monopoly hold only as long as collective self-organization remains foreclosed from outside. The dominion stakes are held from within the class itself and outlast that foreclosure — which is why they need confronting through internal organizational practice (the section below), not only the lifting of external repression.

The primary task: building healthy workers' organizations

The building of healthy, democratic, and internally honest workers' organizations must become a primary goal of the struggle against class rule — not an instrument for seizing state power, to be discarded or disciplined once it has served its purpose.

The binding analysis sets the scope. An organization that wins higher pay while leaving patriarchal compensation, ethnic wages, or credential gatekeeping intact has loosened one binding mechanism while leaving the system's reserves untouched — and the form-switching analysis predicts what follows: concede on wages, tighten on status; extend recognition to one group, sharpen exclusion of another. Addressing all the domains through which binding operates is not a moral aspiration but the condition for preventing form-switching from absorbing the gains. The same logic applies internally: an organization that reproduces managerial hierarchies, tolerates ethnic or gendered subordination among its members, or treats internal democracy as a luxury is not merely falling short of its principles — it is sliding toward functioning as a competing solidarity, providing class goods while reinforcing the binding mechanisms class rule depends on. The line between the two is a frontier, not a clean kind: the in-group preference that deep solidarity requires cannot be eliminated by design, only managed, so "healthy" names a position held on that frontier against constant pressure, not a state safely reached.[60][61]

These are two distinct problems, and the companion essays address them at different levels. This essay analyzes the external challenge: how class rule binds workers across multiple domains, and why organizations that leave domains uncontested will see their gains absorbed through form-switching. "Holding the Form Open" addresses the internal challenge: how organizations reproduce class rule within themselves through coordinator crystallization, boundary hardening, aspirational capture, and gendered domain separation, and what design features counteract those pathologies. Neither level is sufficient on its own. An internally well-designed organization that contests only one domain will be form-switched around. An organization that attempts breadth across domains while reproducing hierarchy internally will lose its capacity to sustain that breadth. And even organizations that solve both problems still face societal-level accommodation and foreclosure — the mechanisms which, section 4 argues, sustain stable class societies without requiring belief — which no single organization's design neutralizes at the scale of a society, however much organizing erodes them (the scalar problem below).

But breadth alone is insufficient. As argued in section 2, organizations that provide goods and services bureaucratically — however many domains they cover — do not by themselves rebuild collective self-governance, and risk producing dependence instead. Red Vienna is the negative case: broad socialist infrastructure (subsistence, education, culture, housing) whose cultural apparatus channeled participation into mobilization rather than self-governance, and whose armed wing had no doctrine for acting without party authorization. When the government moved against the movement in February 1934, the Schutzbund was under orders to keep its weapons at hand but "make no use of those weapons unless it was attacked," and the fighting began in Linz, where the local commander acted without the party directorate's knowledge (Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, vol. 2, pp. 1279, 1282). The companion essay on competing solidarities reads this as "organizational self-incapacitation," a term it takes from Tasca's account of the Italian socialists, via Riley. What builds resilience is provision through shared practice: collectively governed childcare, mutual aid that requires participation, political education that develops pattern recognition through experience. That essay develops this as the distinction between synergistic satisfiers (those that address several needs at once, each reinforcing the others) and inhibiting satisfiers (those that over-provide on one need while constraining autonomy and other needs).

A related point about gender. "Not tolerating gendered subordination" is a principle; the historical evidence shows that principles are insufficient. The companion essay on competing solidarities finds that the left cases it examines deferred the confrontation with gendered exploitation and paid for it, with two intermediate cases (the MST, Kerala) and one exception (Rojava). The difference between failure and partial success was structural: autonomous women's organization (Mujeres Libres, which was denied the organizational standing to institutionalize it) with initiating power over the broader movement (Rojava's Women's Assembly), gender constitutive of organizational form (Rojava's binding co-presidency), not gender added as a committee or department. As long as the confrontation with patriarchy is treated as one item on a list of injustices rather than as a design requirement that shapes the organization's architecture, it will be deferred, because the men who benefit from deferral control the decision.

Two qualifications are needed here, because they bear directly on what these organizations can realistically promise. Even if the organizational problem were solved — even if we built movements broad enough to foreclose form-switching — the material conditions for emancipation would still have to be met. A post-revolutionary society that lacks sufficient concentrated energy and the machinery to deploy it is pushed toward the cheaper course: intensify the exploitation of living labor, which is to say, deepen exploitation under a different political form. This is the developmental trap that every revolutionary project has faced.[62] The trap is triple: insufficient energy drives intensified exploitation of the living; the machinery that could substitute for living labor is constitutively shaped by capital's requirements and presupposes the social relations of domination it was built to serve; and that same machinery presupposes ecological throughput rates whose continuation degrades the material base on which production depends. The energy regime is the material basis of all three constraints.

This does not counsel despair any more than the ambivalence argument does. But it means that organizational practice and material preconditions are complementary requirements, not alternatives, and that any serious strategy must address both.[63] The prescriptions that follow are necessary but not sufficient.

A second qualification concerns organizational design. Even with adequate material conditions, the scalar problem remains unsolved: no historical case that built locally rooted, dimensionally comprehensive solidarity composed it at the scale of the forces it faced. Where those forces were brought to bear — Franco's army, the Dollfuss coup, the Turkish invasion of Afrin, the three cases the companion essay on organizational design also names — the local form was destroyed, and the cases that survived, Kerala's and the MST's, survived without solving the problem. How to compose local solidarities into coordinated action at the scale of the forces they face, without subordinating local to center (the Comintern pattern) or leaving local defenseless (the anarchist pattern), has not been figured out; the companion essay on competing solidarities names the two failure patterns.

These two qualifications are not independent. The companion essay on organizational design argues that four of its five constraints on organizational design reinforce one another and terminate in conditions least available in the core-country metropolitan contexts where the design is most needed. The scalar problem compounds this: the material conditions that make the design features operable are also what would make coordination at larger scales possible, because an organization with no territorial base, no independent funding, and no militant minority has nothing to federate. The material preconditions and the organizational design problem are not separate caveats but composing constraints, and the composition is what makes the problem harder than either qualification alone suggests.

Combating class collaboration without nostalgia

If the past century teaches a second lesson, it is that the workers' movement's dependence on state-provided use values (built without any critique of bourgeois control over their delivery) left it unable to resist neoliberal rollback when it came. This was compounded by the fact that neoliberal managerialism closely resembled the bureaucratization that had already crippled our own organizations and the USSR, making it almost impossible to critique one without confronting the other.

The material basis of this dependence deserves direct treatment, because it explains both why rollback succeeded and why restoration is structurally impossible on the old terms. The imperial forms framework essay develops the welfare-imperialism circuit in full: input-cheapening conditioned the redistributable surplus (without it the metropolitan wage-good and raw-material bill would have consumed the margin that was in fact redistributed), taxation and credit creation distributed it through public provision, and the arrangement bound metropolitan workers to a national framework whose imperial dimension was structurally invisible to them — the labor aristocracy thesis grounded in institutional rather than conspiratorial terms. The contemporary erosion was sketched in Dispute 1 above. The surplus continues to flow but increasingly bypasses public provision on its way to private accumulation, and the legitimation crisis — visible across the core in the rise of MAGA, AfD, Rassemblement National, Sweden Democrats, Fratelli d'Italia — is not a prediction but current events.[64]

The architecture's destruction of its own distribution mechanism is one route into that crisis, not its only cause. The Danish and Norwegian radical right began as a tax revolt in the welfare state's most expansive years, and its working-class vote grew, on its analysts' account, as working-class organization disintegrated rather than as provision was withdrawn; the radical right's 1990s wave did particularly well in countries and regions with high affluence and low unemployment (the imperial forms framework essay gives the sources). What these cases share is a popular base whose own organizations had already gone — absorbed by the state, emptied as deference to their leaderships lapsed, or dissolved with the industrial workforce — so that the erosion of provision widens and exposes a vacuum it did not create. And which form the crisis takes depends less on which welfare regime is eroding than on what the vacuum still holds: the party lineages in place, the frames available, and which organizations survived to fill it or to be captured. Where the left's own infrastructure has gone, the vacuum is filled by whoever still has infrastructure.

The solution is not to demolish the state or wish for its collapse. Workers won't learn anything from immiseration, and there is no shortcut past the hard work of building new organizations from the ground up. But the left does need to develop a critique of dependence on a state apparatus that is mistrusted and feared by many — if only because the populist right currently holds a near-monopoly on critiques of bureaucracy and the welfare state, while the rest of the left mostly advocates uncritical reintroduction and expansion of state services, and remains fixated on parliamentarianism as the only route to power.

And that critique needs to be honest about the imperial dimension: the postwar welfare states distributed a surplus whose production was conditioned by imperial extraction, within an included population sorted in advance — in Europe by the war itself, whose genocide, expulsions and population exchanges left the continent's states more ethnically uniform than before, and then by citizenship once guest workers were recruited; in the United States by race, through the New Deal's segregation — so that the solidarity their institutions organized never had to reach across those lines. Their institutional architecture assumed the continuation of the included population. They are not a model to be restored; they are a historically specific configuration whose material conditions — the terms-of-trade advantage of those decades and the postwar suspension of industrial competition — no longer exist and whose exclusions were structural, not incidental.

A further dimension of binding that the welfare-circuit analysis tends to obscure: the metropolitan cost ratchet. The companion essay "Not Stages but Depths" identifies the structural mechanism — balance-sheet binding, the multiplication of debt obligations across commodified necessities at stages 4-6 of the commodification sequence. What this essay adds is the political-economic analysis: how each specific cost domain functions as a binding mechanism with its own political dynamics.

As public provision degrades, the costs of reproducing working-class life — housing, healthcare, childcare, education credentials — have risen dramatically, and each cost functions not merely as a burden but as a binding mechanism. High housing costs bind workers to their mortgages and therefore to their employers, their local tax base, and the property-value regime that determines whether their principal asset appreciates or collapses. Credential inflation binds them to the education system — not just for the credential's content but for the sorting function it performs, since the credential's value depends on scarcity that would be destroyed by universal free access. Healthcare costs bind them to employer-provided insurance (in the US) or to the state provision whose erosion they fear (in Europe). Childcare costs bind them to arrangements — family, informal networks, expensive private provision — whose continuation depends on conditions they cannot unilaterally change. These are not just costs that leave less room for political engagement. They are the material mechanism through which the welfare-state competing solidarity continues to bind even as it degrades: workers defend an arrangement that is failing them because the cost of exit — losing the house, losing the credential's market value, losing healthcare, losing childcare — is higher than the cost of enduring degraded provision.

One cross-national qualification keeps this from proving too much. Binding is not a function of how much a household owes but of whether debt-service failure cascades into catastrophe — and that linkage is exactly what universal institutions sever. Some of the highest household-debt-to-income ratios (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden) sit beside high union density and durable collective-action capacity in the three Nordic countries, while low-debt France has a strike record its low density does not predict. Read off debt levels alone, the mechanism fails; read off the debt-to-catastrophe linkage, it accounts for the Nordic half of that picture: Ghent-system unemployment insurance (in Denmark and Sweden; Norway has none), universal welfare floors that decouple job loss from the loss of health and shelter, and mortgage regimes in which default does not cascade all hold the linkage low, so the same nominal debt binds far less. Where those institutions are absent — the US, where coverage is tied to the job and default means ruin — the identical debt binds hard. France is not confirmation: its strike capacity sits in chokepoint sectors (rail, refineries, ports, energy), and what the comparison supports is narrower — the linkage governs how far balance-sheet binding suppresses capacity, not capacity as such. This is why the erosion of universal provision is not only a loss of goods but a tightening of the binding: it restores the linkage the institutions had severed. It is the same non-monotonicity that operates within a country by class position (below), read at the scale of the welfare regime.

This produces a specific political dynamic the essay's analysis predicts. Does the degradation of provision loosen the bindings (as provision fails, it delivers less, and the binding weakens) or tighten them (as provision degrades, what remains becomes more precious, and workers defend it more fiercely)? The answer varies by domain and class position. For workers near the bottom of the cost ratchet — renters rather than owners, workers without employer-provided insurance, parents without childcare access — degradation loosens binding because they have less to lose. For workers in the middle — mortgaged homeowners, workers with employer-provided benefits, parents dependent on specific childcare arrangements — degradation tightens binding because the remaining provision is what separates them from the bottom. The political implications diverge: the loosened populations are available for alternative competing solidarities (left or right); the tightened populations are available for reactionary defense of existing arrangements.

The right's success in mobilizing the tightened middle — defending "what we have" against perceived threats from below — is the cost-ratchet mechanism operating as political strategy, and it works because the binding is material rather than ideological. Workers who defend exclusionary arrangements are not necessarily racist or chauvinist in their motivations; they are defending the material position the cost ratchet makes precarious, and the defense takes exclusionary form because the institutional architecture creates the threat conditions that activate group-defensive dispositions and channels them that way — material precarity and the dispositional response working together, not the former alone.

Solidarity as practice, not slogan

Solidarity must be practiced — in propaganda, in education, and in the daily functioning of our organizations. This means treating anti-chauvinism work as a direct consequence of class analysis — which is what it is, once "class" is defined broadly enough. And it means accepting that unity is hard work — that it requires honestly confronting the material interests many workers have in maintaining aspects of class rule, instead of pretending those interests away. The pattern-recognition and cross-domain work described in section 4 is part of this practice, not a separate educational program.

Practice reaches what propaganda and education cannot because the disposition it works on was installed affectively, not argued into place — the mechanism section 4 pointed to. "Matter Out of Place" specifies how it can come undone: the boundary between those who count and those who contaminate can de-install through alternative experiences of proximity that disconfirm it at the bodily level — but not all proximity does this work, and the difference is what makes practice a design problem rather than a matter of good intentions. Episodic proximity — the volunteer afternoon, the one-off encounter — is reabsorbed as exception ("one of the good ones"), because the evaluating subject stays in place: you observed them, judged them acceptable, and the boundary was never at risk. Structural proximity — where people depend on each other, where the relation carries mutual vulnerability rather than one-sided observation — is harder to reabsorb, because needing someone you were trained to find threatening dissolves the position from which you judged them. This is why a strike or an occupation does what a lecture cannot, and it is the premise behind the deep-organizing and intra-class-privilege traditions examined below: you cannot tell workers their investment in hierarchy is against their interests; you have to build the contexts in which they discover it. It is also why the destruction of organizational infrastructure is an affective defeat and not only a tactical one — the boundary reinstalls through the daily rhythm of separated, enclosed selves the moment the form that held it open is gone, which is why these forms have to be sustained long enough for the boundary's absence to settle into disposition: a second nature organized around solidarity rather than enclosure.

We must also learn to engage with the existing ecosystem of social movements and NGOs, however imperfect.[65] Much of the practical agitation, political education, and solidarity work is already being done — inconsistently, often in liberal frameworks, frequently captured by professional activists with conflicting incentives. But the alternative to engaging with this messy reality is the sectarian purity that has left us marginal for decades.

This engagement has to be clear-eyed, though. The professionalization of social movements is itself a form of class rule: the credentialed NGO professional who derives income and status from an intermediary position between funders and "beneficiaries" is exercising power over others who cannot hold them to any return. Where the base supplies the mobilization and legitimacy the professional converts into income and standing, under a funding structure the base cannot exit, this is a class relation by the definition proposed above; even where it stops short of that, it extends the same logic into the intermediary position. The companion essay "What to Do About NGOs" develops this in full — the funding mechanisms, the advocacy/mobilizing/organizing distinction, concrete cases. What matters here is the consequence: any serious engagement with this ecosystem has to grapple with the material interests of NGO staff in maintaining things as they are, because those interests will resist democratization, rotation, and de-skilling for the same reasons that any other form of class privilege is defended.

These dynamics are not specific to NGOs. They threaten any organization that accumulates institutional apparatus. The companion essay on competing solidarities documents the same pattern in the pre-1914 SPD (professionalization converting participatory culture into performance, institutional interests displacing oppositional purpose), in Red Vienna (the negative case analyzed above), and in the AKP's trajectory from grassroots mobilization to "sanctified neoliberalization" (organizational complexity routing participation to non-economic dimensions where it could not contest class-serving decisions). In each case, the organization's own institutional success generated class interests within it that drove it toward accommodation with the system it was built to challenge. But what the cases also share is that the organizational form through which the success was accumulated determined how much leverage those interests had: the SPD's centralized treasury, concentrated leadership and accumulated press infrastructure made its institutional interests maximally punishing to defy in 1914; a differently designed organization with the same accumulated interests would have faced a different choice set. The companion essay on organizational design develops this as a three-mechanism analysis: endogenous class interests, exogenous state pressure, and the mediating organizational form that determines how much the second can extract from the first.

The underlying principle is general: any organizational feature that decouples the organization's material survival from its members' active engagement reproduces the professionalization pattern. Structural mechanisms that keep the coupling contestable are needed — base control over leadership selection and recall, mandatory rotation, de-skilling of specialized functions so that the organization is not dependent on irreplaceable professionals, and independent funding that does not flow through intermediaries whose class position is shaped by the funding relationship. These guarantee contestability, not prevention: as the CTU case below shows, they let an opposition form and fight, they do not stop the pattern from re-emerging.

The Chicago Teachers Union's CORE transformation — a rank-and-file caucus capturing an existing union through internal elections in 2010 and redirecting it from service-model unionism toward organizing — is the strongest contemporary evidence that one of these features — internal elections with real stakes under membership-controlled rules, with caucus infrastructure independent of the staff — can keep professionalization contestable. Rotation, de-skilling and independent funding the case does not test, and rotation it visibly lacked. But the case is more complicated than the single-reversal story suggests. Within fifteen years of the original capture, CORE developed financial opacity (five years of withheld audits revealing adverse auditor opinions), suppression of internal dissent (the House of Delegates banning publication of its own minutes), and leadership acting against its own bylaws — the pattern the structural features were supposed to prevent. A reform caucus (REAL) formed within the membership and ran on transparency in May 2025, demonstrating that the structural features did their permissive work: an internal opposition could form and contest. They did not do preventive work. The companion essay on organizational design develops the case in full and draws the implication: what the design features actually do may be better measured by the interval between reform captures than by whether the pattern re-emerges at all — but only if that measure is held to a falsifiable standard rather than scoring every re-emergence as success at a longer horizon. The design counts as working where the interval to displacement demonstrably exceeds what comparable undesigned organizations manage and an opposition retains the capacity to win, not merely to run; on that standard REAL's 2025 defeat, with CORE incumbent and the disclosure pattern unresolved, is evidence against the design's sufficiency, and the honest reading is that whether the features lengthen the interval at all is not yet established, since only one capture has occurred and no second displacement has been observed to time it against.[66]

Precedents

These principles are not new. Several organizing traditions have attempted versions of what I'm arguing for. Each achieved something real, and each fell short in ways worth examining. I'll sketch four, focusing in each case on what worked and where it fell short — in theory for some, in practice or organization for others.

Deep organizing. Jane McAlevey's work (both as a practitioner and in No Shortcuts, 2016) builds workers' organizations that treat members as whole people embedded in communities rather than as atomized grievance-holders. Her methods are concrete: identify organic leaders (people others already turn to, not self-selectors), build supermajority participation before acting, use structure tests to verify real support. Her cases come from health care and education, which she treats as the strategic sectors of the service economy: they cannot be moved offshore, and the workers' tie to the communities they serve is, in her words, "an incredible strategic advantage." Her Smithfield case shows the method winning in manufacturing too, where employers' exit threats make it "objectively harder."

Brazil's MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra) extends the integration further, folding land occupation, education, gender politics, production, and political formation into a single organizational practice grounded in territorial control. The territorial base is what makes the dimensional integration possible: cooperatives and seed networks can function as permanent infrastructure because they sit on land the movement physically controls, while the settlement schools, which state and municipal governments administer, persist through what Tarlau calls "contentious co-governance."[67]

The limitation in both cases is twofold. First, neither approach treats the forms of class exploitation that do not run through the commodity form discussed above — credential-based hierarchies, meritocratic reasoning as such — as objects of analysis or contestation. Second, neither escapes political dependence on bourgeois parties and the state: McAlevey's model builds worker power for contracts and, in her later work, for elections and legislation, but within existing political structures, the Democratic Party included, while the MST, which kept its formal independence and its occupations throughout and co-governs its schools with the state, met a distinctive form of metabolization in its alliance with the PT (Workers' Party) — the PT did not absorb the MST organizationally but made its core demand structurally irrelevant by combining agribusiness promotion with compensatory welfare, producing organizational erosion through demand-redundancy rather than through the class-collaborationist capture described under "Combating class collaboration without nostalgia". It was also a form of metabolization the movement could not name without attacking the ally whose fall would bring something worse. Tarlau, writing as Bolsonaro took office, expected that infrastructure, the cooperatives at least, to outlast the loss of federal support. But the territorial base depends on the process of land commodification being arrested at an early stage — land still open to occupation and not yet financialized — a semi-peripheral condition unavailable in core-country metropolitan settings where that process has run to completion. Both cases represent the best versions of what they are. What neither offers is a strategy for fighting class rule beyond the wage and beyond the state under conditions of deep commodification.[68]

Democratic organization-building. Ella Baker's organizing philosophy, developed through SNCC and documented in Barbara Ransby's Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement (2003), treated democratic organization-building — not organization-building in general, but democratic form as such — as a primary goal rather than a means to campaign victories. Her critique of charismatic leadership and her insistence on developing local decision-making capacity treated democratic organization as the goal, not the vehicle. SNCC at its best practiced this: young organizers embedded in local communities, following local leadership instead of bringing in external agendas.

But SNCC ultimately fractured, along lines of race, gender, and strategic direction, in ways that confirm the difficulty of what I'm proposing. The organization had no general framework for understanding why intra-movement divisions proved so persistent, and no developed practice for confronting the material interests (in racial privilege, in gendered authority, in credential-based status) that its members brought with them into the movement. Baker understood the problem intuitively; SNCC as an organization could not institutionalize the solution.[69]

Confronting intra-class privilege. The Sojourner Truth Organization, active in Chicago-area workplaces during the 1970s, tried something different: making the confrontation of intra-class privilege a precondition for class unity rather than a byproduct of it. Drawing on Du Bois's Black Reconstruction, on Ted Allen's and Noel Ignatin's analysis of "white skin privilege," and on C.L.R. James, STO organizers worked to draw white workers into struggles in which they could experience cross-racial solidarity as materially superior to racial division — not through lectures about privilege but through joint action in which the division was concretely costly. The premise was that you cannot simply tell workers their investment in racial hierarchy is against their interests; you have to build organizational contexts in which they discover this through practice. The same point applies more broadly: all forms of class-societal benefit — not just racial privilege — need to be confronted through organizational practice, not ideological correction.

Where STO fell short was not its theory, which was general: its "dual consciousness" was an account of why workers accept capitalist ideas at all, it treated white skin privilege as "symptomatic and exemplary of a broader obstacle to revolution," and it took up patriarchy alongside white supremacy. It fell short in practice. It never had more than about a hundred members, and its historian traces its demise to "a perpetual failure to speak in practice to the breadth and depth of the lives and dreams of any appreciable section of the working class," to strategic directions that never lasted "longer than a couple years," and to a group that "repeatedly sabotaged itself." Read through this essay's lens, that is a correct analysis of one form of class-societal benefit without the organizational infrastructure to make solidarity rewarding across the rest of its members' lives.[70]

Political education as pattern recognition. Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1968) and the Highlander Folk School's practice — documented in Myles Horton's The Long Haul (1990) and in Horton and Freire's joint We Make the Road by Walking (1990) — are organized around developing the capacity to recognize meritocratic reasoning as a form. Freire's "conscientization" is the process of learning to see structural patterns in one's own experience — as opposed to having them explained from above. His critique of "banking education" — in which the teacher deposits knowledge into passive students — is itself an analysis of how institutional structures reproduce class dynamics through their form, not just their content. Highlander put this into practice: Rosa Parks attended one of its workshops in 1955, shortly before she refused to give up her bus seat; its citizenship schools (from 1957, handed to the SCLC in 1961) taught literacy as the start of group action: "Along with becoming literate, they learned to organize, they learned to protest, they learned to demand their rights" (The Long Haul, p. 104); and at the request of both SCLC and SNCC it trained the people who ran the citizenship schools and the voter-registration drives. In 1961 the state of Tennessee revoked Highlander's charter and confiscated the school, after hearings aimed at organizations working for racial integration; the conviction that stood was for selling beer without a license and operating the school for personal gain.

But the pedagogy left an organizational gap. Freire did not lack a class analysis: in his conversations with Horton he says the education the dominant classes offer the working class "reproduces the working class as such," and that this is "the ideological intention of the ruling class" (We Make the Road by Walking, p. 213). The gap was Highlander's: for all its effectiveness, it functioned as an educational institution that trained leaders for other movements rather than building organizational power of its own. It addressed the political education deficit without solving the organizational one — which is why its graduates' subsequent impact depended on the quality of the organizations they returned to.[71]

What these cases share with the Spanish ateneos, Red Vienna, the pre-1914 SPD, the Proletkult, and Rojava is a pattern: what succeeded was the degree to which the organization addressed multiple dimensions simultaneously, treating workers as whole people and building forms of social life that could compete with what the right provides through churches, mosques, and nationalist organizations. A dimension the tradition has been slow to name: what made participation in these formations self-sustaining when they worked is a property of the relational form, not a quality read off the fact that they lasted. Communal sharing and equality matching are open-ended — the obligation is never settled up, so it sustains the relationship and deposits organizational residue the next cycle inherits; market pricing is self-liquidating, closing the account on settlement. That is why CS/EM-based formations tend to reproduce their own participatory basis while transactional ones consume it, and the companion essay "Not Stages but Depths" develops the mechanism. The MST's mística, SNCC's freedom songs, the ateneo's play, Highlander's integrative workshops were the experiential surface of this shift, and participants did report the mode as richer than what it replaced — more rewarding, more generative — but that report is the mechanism's phenomenology, not its cause. Nor is the relational mode the sole sustainer: material stakes and external threat operate alongside it as distinct channels, which is why the MST case above codes coherently rather than contradictorily — the mística sustaining participation while the PT's demand-redundancy eroded the material basis, two mechanisms operating at once. The positive phenomenology of this experience — what self-directed collective activity actually feels like when the conditions support it — is what the left has lost access to as its organizational infrastructure was destroyed, and what must be rebuilt through practice rather than promised through program.

What failed was, in each case, identifiable: professionalization converting play into performance and institutional interests displacing oppositional purpose (the SPD); a cultural apparatus channeling participation into mobilization rather than self-governance, and an armed wing bound to the party's authorization (Red Vienna); metabolization by a nominally sympathetic state (the Proletkult); cadre instrumentalization suppressing the participatory dimensions (Rojava); gender deferred until it was too late (every historical case except Rojava); and reproduction conditions (education pipelines, media, spatial anchoring) that the state destroyed or that the movement never built.

The form-switching mechanism developed in section 3 explains why even the victories were absorbed rather than cumulative: each tradition contested class rule along specific channels, and the fractions it threatened redirected extraction through channels the resistance left uncontested. The civil rights movement is a further instance — organized resistance made overt racial discrimination too costly, and employers and the state compensated through formally race-neutral mechanisms (mass incarceration, predatory lending, residential sorting) that maintained the extraction while satisfying the new legitimation constraints. None of the traditions sketched above covered every channel the configuration made available, which is what would have made redirection impossible — which is what the combination this essay calls for would need to do.[72]

This does not mean form-switching makes resistance futile. Each transition after the first was forced by organized struggle, and each new form operated under changed legitimation constraints that created terrain for future resistance — convict leasing had to route through criminal law rather than property law, which constrained its form and created new vulnerabilities. But the pattern does mean that the left's recurring experience of winning battles and losing the war is a structural feature of how class rule adapts to challenge, and it will continue until resistance is organized broadly enough to foreclose the redirection and deeply enough to rebuild the relational infrastructure the commodification sequence destroyed. That foreclosure is a directional hypothesis, not a demonstrated result: no case has yet achieved it — the combination this essay calls for does not exist — and it is stated so as to be disconfirmable rather than to absorb every failure as "insufficient breadth." The imperial forms framework specifies what would falsify it: if resistance reduced aggregate extraction along one channel with no redirection through other channels, and without the exception condition being met (blocking redirection and durably rebuilding the relational infrastructure), the mechanism would need revising, and "breadth" is anchored to the imperial forms framework's named mediating factors rather than read off whether redirection happened. The framework is explicit that the tendency is broken only by resistance that both blocks redirection and rebuilds that relational infrastructure.[73]

An adequate strategy would need to combine what the strongest of these traditions did well — the MST's and McAlevey's operational discipline, Baker's commitment to democratic capacity-building, STO's willingness to confront intra-class privilege, Freire and Highlander's integrative pedagogy — while addressing what each left out. That combination does not yet exist, and figuring out how to build it is the work ahead of us.

But the traditions share a further vulnerability that the strategic assessment must name. Each built concentrated organizational capacity — an identifiable cadre carrying the analysis, the methods, and the relationships. That concentration made them targetable. COINTELPRO destroyed the Black Panther Party's organizing core. The CIO's left unions were destroyed by McCarthyism, compounded by the Communist Party leadership's own strategic errors — not by oligarchic drift but by the removal of the organizing cadre. In Indonesia in 1965–66 the army used party membership lists to identify and kill; between five hundred thousand and one million people were slaughtered (Bevins, The Jakarta Method, 2020), far beyond any organizing core. The 1980 Turkish coup detained the organized left en masse while leaving religious infrastructure standing; the Southern Cone dictatorships disappeared shop stewards and community leaders. In each, among everything else it destroyed, the repressive apparatus located and removed the politically conscious organizing core, as "Distributed Relational Capacity" traces. A strategy that depends on concentrated capacity fails precisely when it succeeds at producing what it needs, because what it needs is identifiable and destroyable. The defensive conclusion is that organizational capacity must be distributed broadly enough through a population that no operation targeting an identifiable cadre can decapitate it — not concentrated in a cadre but woven into the daily relational practice of people who are not primarily "political." The claim is specific: distributed density defeats decapitation, the removal of a concentrated organizing core; it does not by itself defeat destruction by superior armed force, which is why the ateneos — dense but lacking federated fission capacity — still fell to Franco's army, and why the scalar problem named above remains a separate, unsolved constraint. No case in this essay shows the converse, a dense formation surviving a campaign of decapitation; the claim rests on the mechanism, which "Distributed Relational Capacity" develops with Kerala's survival of the Emergency as its illustration (over-determined, by that essay's own account), and the record it predicts is still owed. What crowded out rival formations in the positive cases (CPI-M in Kerala, the ateneos in pre-civil-war Barcelona) was not only a cadre but a density of organizational infrastructure constituting the social life of the neighborhood or region — and where a cadre was present, as in CPI-M, it was the density around it, not its absence, that did the crowding-out. Building that density — distributed relational capacity in addition to, not instead of, a militant core — is what "building healthy workers' organizations" must mean if the organizations are to survive.

In sum

It was a strategic mistake to think we could end capitalism by fighting capitalism. The proximate fight is with class rule — the full system of institutionalized relationships through which some people get others to perform labor for them without owing them a return they can hold them to, in the market, the household, and organizational life, and everywhere these overlap. Fighting this effectively requires a broader definition of class, an honest accounting of why unity is difficult, organizations whose internal practices embody the solidarity they preach, organizations whose capacity is distributed broadly enough to survive the targeting of their organizers, and what the companion essay "Not Stages but Depths" develops as the relational-mode shift — communal sharing and equality matching rather than market pricing's transactional logic — that makes participation self-sustaining rather than effortful. None of that is simple, and none of it will be quick.

We are working against a century and a half of received wisdom in which the Marxist left treated the building of healthy worker organizations as instrumentally valuable at best — something to be tolerated insofar as it served the struggle for state power. Changing this will require argument, experimentation, and a good deal of patience. But the theoretical and practical foundations are there, scattered across traditions that rarely talk to each other, and enough people are already doing parts of the work — even if they don't always share our terminology — that there is something real to build on. And the strongest historical precedents point to something the patience framing undersells: that the alternative relational mode, when conditions support it, tends to reproduce its own participatory basis — the open-ended obligation of communal sharing and equality matching deposits the residue the next cycle inherits, where transactional forms consume it — and that participants experience it as richer than what it replaced (the mística, the freedom songs, the ateneo's play), which is what gives the work its own motivational force alongside the material stakes and shared threat that also hold people in.

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Footnotes (73)
  1. This essay originated as a response to Mike Macnair's review of Catherine Liu's Virtue Hoarders in the Weekly Worker. My first reply can be found here; Macnair's response here; my second reply here. The present piece substantially reworks and extends the arguments made in those exchanges.

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  2. This has a long and impressive pedigree. See, among others, Trotsky, "The War and the International" (1914); Lenin, Imperialism: the highest stage of capitalism (1917); Lukács, Lenin: a study on the unity of his thought (1924); Mandel, "The Marxist theory of Imperialism and its critics" (1966); Ticktin, "The Nature of an Epoch of Declining Capitalism," Critique (1998). One particularly poignant entry is Lewis Corey's 1934 book declaring and analyzing the decline of US capitalism. Closely related is the tendency to add modifiers — "late," "monopoly," "post-" — that take on unhelpful lives of their own.

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  3. The pressure has been measured. Rasmussen and Knutsen (Reforming to Survive: The Bolshevik Origins of Social Policies, 2022) treat an invitation to the first Comintern congress in 1919 as a signal that told elites which labor movements were revolutionary, and find that invited countries cut legislated working hours and widened industrial workers' coverage against old-age, sickness, maternity, accident, unemployment and child-rearing risk markedly further than the rest. The Norwegian employers' association said the quiet part internally: its chief executive told the board that the 1919 concessions were a form of "insurance" against social upheaval, and the association's paper later summed up the bargaining as having taken place under "the sign of the revolution" (Rasmussen and Knutsen, p. 38). Two limits matter, because the finding is usually reported without them. It measures those two things, not the welfare state whole. And the response was not general — the same authors name Japan and the United States as places where the Bolshevik threat "was met by repression rather than new social policies," a divergence they flag as unexplained. Which is the right shape for the claim made here: a workers' state raised the price of refusing everywhere, and settled nowhere what would actually be paid, or whether the answer would be provision or the police.

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  4. Judith Stepan-Norris and Maurice Zeitlin, Left Out: Reds and America's Industrial Unions (2003), p. 84: CIO officials "put eleven unions on trial and expelled them," on "elaborate, pseudolegal 'cases'" (quoting Zieger 1986).

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  5. On university education as socialization, see Jeff Schmidt, Disciplined Minds. See also "Disciplined into Deserving: Education and the Reproduction of Meritocratic Reasoning" at beyondmeritocracy.info for a fuller discussion of how educational institutions encode meritocratic values.

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  6. On the boom's end, Michael Hudson, Super Imperialism, traces the dollar's deepening deficit to US military expenditure abroad; the other elements named here (western economic maturation, industrial competition, oil dependence) are this essay's summary.

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  7. Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick and Richard Hyman, Trade Unions in Western Europe: Hard Times, Hard Choices (2013), p. 38: in Sweden "insurance contributions were increased dramatically (roughly fourfold) in 2007, while tax allowances were abolished"; "LO suffered worst: it lost 16 per cent of its membership between 2007 and 2010." The imperial forms framework places this repricing in the metabolization of the Swedish popular movements.

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  8. "How Class Rule Generates Imperial Forms" at beyondmeritocracy.info develops the ecological-material argument in detail, identifying two compounding trajectories: the institutional architecture's own success eroding the welfare circuit through which metropolitan consent was sustained (the ratchet mechanism — each commitment harder to reverse than to make — destroying the distribution mechanism while the surplus continues to flow), and the ecological feedback loop physically contracting the surplus available for distribution. The energy regime is the material substrate: the ratio of living to non-living energy in a production system is a class-political variable that determines where workers have leverage and what forms of exploitation are available. As concentrated energy becomes scarcer, the system compensates by intensifying exploitation of the living — the structural tendency the body text names. The energy dimension is developed fully in "Living and Non-Living: Why Emancipation Is an Energy Question" at beyondmeritocracy.info.

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  9. On wartime union growth and unions at their peak at the war's end, see Milkman, Gender at Work, pp. 66, 85, 125.

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  10. Ruth Milkman's Gender at Work (1987) documents the US mechanism in detail: management led the postwar purge of women from wartime "men's jobs" and refused to rehire them despite women overwhelmingly wanting to continue working (75–85% in wartime surveys). The CIO officially supported equal seniority rights, but male unionists failed to defend women's seniority consistently, a failure that, Milkman argues, "gave a key political signal to management" (p. 104), though she ranks hiring policy above seniority: "hiring policy proved far more crucial than seniority" (p. 109). Women did not simply "go back to the home": their employment passed its wartime peak by the early 1950s (p. 100), but laid-off electrical workers were recalled "only to traditionally 'female' jobs" (p. 110), and in auto, excluding women from "men's jobs" "usually meant excluding them from the industry as a whole" (p. 109). The broader point is the essay's own reading, which goes beyond Milkman: men across class lines benefited from the reconstruction and did not resist it, because it restored access to domestic labor and household authority that wartime employment had disrupted.

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  11. A note on terminology: Marx's "use value" is not confined to commodities — "a thing can be a use-value without being a value," and "a thing can be useful, and a product of human labour, without being a commodity" (Capital, vol. 1, ch. 1) — but his analysis attends to it mainly as the bearer of exchange value. I am putting it to wider work. The logic by which someone extracts domestic labor, sexual availability, or social deference without reciprocating is structurally identical to the logic by which an employer extracts surplus value: in both cases, one party obtains something they want from another's effort while institutionalized power ensures they don't have to give back equivalently. What the market framework obscures is that people routinely instrumentalize others as dispensers of use values, particularly where power asymmetries make this easy and consequence-free. The treatment of women across all class societies illustrates the point: their labor is exploited across domestic, sexual, emotional, and economic domains simultaneously, with their inability to hold anyone to a return enforced by legal, cultural, and physical means. Treating use value only as the bearer of exchange value makes this invisible to class analysis. Broadening it makes it legible. What is not being claimed is that the services themselves are unmarketable: cleaning, cooking, childcare and sex are bought and sold every day. Christine Delphy's point is the one to keep in view: what the household secures is their supply without payment and as a personal obligation, which is a matter of the relation under which the work is done, not of the tasks (Close to Home: A Materialist Analysis of Women's Oppression, trans. and ed. Diana Leonard, 1984; London: Verso, 2016).

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  12. On fascist gender politics, see Victoria De Grazia, How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922–1945 (1992), and Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics (1987). De Grazia writes that "Mussolini's regime stood for returning women to home and hearth, restoring patriarchal authority" (p. 1), and also of a "deep conflict within the fascist state between the demands of modernity and the desire to reimpose traditional authority" (p. 2). Koonz finds Nazi propaganda praising the traditional family while the Frauenschaft "attacked key aspects of the traditional family" (p. 189). That male supporters took the offer up is this essay's inference, not either author's finding.

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  13. The Napoleonic Code (1804) put the married woman under her husband's authority (Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 128: "Woman owes obedience to her husband") and, in Donzelot's words, "had maintained part of the old power of the family" over its children, article 375 letting a father have a child imprisoned (p. 85). Jacques Donzelot, The Policing of Families (1977), documents how bourgeois reformers then deliberately constructed gendered household authority as labor discipline: in Donzelot's account of Jules Simon's works, the housewife was "the privileged instrument for civilizing the working class" — she would "stamp out the spirit of independence in the working man." Housing was designed as a disciplinary tool ("the grave of the riot," its physician announced), with eligibility contingent on moral compliance. Donzelot puts cohabitation without marriage, which observers noted from the middle of the century, at between one-third and one-half of working-class couples depending on the area (p. 34), and reports the "customary reply" of cohabiting workers to philanthropists who asked why they did not marry: "First give us back divorce, then we'll see" (p. 90; the Restoration had abolished the divorce the Revolution granted). The reformers pressed the family form on a working class that, in these figures, was not adopting it of its own accord.

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  14. The record runs through tourism, not through promotion of prostitution as such. The World Bank promoted tourism — its 1975 sector review of Thailand counts "extensive nightlife" among the country's assets and never mentions prostitution — while its tourism department had the association in view: its consultant thought "some tourists undoubtedly seek these services" and advised regulating prostitution (Noronha 1977), and a chapter co-written by a member of its staff reported "an increase in prostitution" where a Bank-financed Mexican resort's construction drew in far more men than women (Reynoso y Valle and de Regt 1979). Some officials did the encouraging: in 1980 a Thai vice-premier asked provincial governors to consider, beside their scenery, "some forms of entertainment that some of you might consider disgusting and shameful" (Truong 1990, p. 179), and Philippine municipalities licensed establishments "known to be fronts for prostitution" (Ofreneo and Ofreneo, in Lim, ed., 1998). Lim's conclusion to the ILO's four-country study finds no "intentional policy … to promote prostitution as an economic activity," but macroeconomic policies that "have undoubtedly influenced the growth of the sex sector." On stigma feeding repression, see Walkowitz (1980) on Victorian repeal anger "rechanneled into repressive antivice campaigns," and Smith and Mac (2018) on residents' campaigns that "sometimes resort to vigilante violence." On the use of sexual exploitation as an elite management tool, see also the Democracy at Work discussion of Jeffrey Epstein.

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  15. The distribution of child-rearing is not hypothetical. Distributed, multi-caregiver child-rearing — older siblings, grandmothers, and other adults sharing what the privatized household concentrates in one or two — is the cross-cultural and historical norm the privatized family displaced; the isolated parental dyad is the industrial exception, produced by neolocal residence, wage labor away from home, schooling, and kin dispersal (Weisner and Gallimore 1977; Karen L. Kramer, "Cooperative Breeding and its Significance to the Demographic Success of Humans," Annual Review of Anthropology 39 [2010]). "The Conditions of Care" develops the point; what matters here is that the unaccountable parental authority this paragraph describes is a feature of a specific, recent family form, not a natural fact about raising children. That historical norm distributed care without making authority accountable — sibling caretaking was itself extracted, disproportionately from older daughters (see fn-childcaretaking) — so the accountability the body text asks for has to come from how a collective arrangement is governed, not from distribution alone.

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  16. Federici's Caliban and the Witch (2004) argues that the early modern witch trials facilitated primitive accumulation by destroying women's autonomous social power. The framing overstates both the intentionality of the process and the targeting of specific knowledge (midwifery, healing) as the motive — the specialist historiography locates most accusations in conflicts between neighbors "fairly close in economic terms" (Briggs, Witches and Neighbours, 2002, p. 294). In Briggs's Lorraine material the accused were "on average much older and slightly poorer than their neighbours," around half the women widows (p. 257), and where figures exist midwives were "rather under represented among the accused" (p. 88). The structural effect was real — the destruction of communal female social structures through the available pretext of religious-orthodoxy enforcement, at a moment when confessional consolidation and emerging state formation were intertwined (Federici's own observation is that Catholic and Protestant states, "at war against each other in every other respect, joined arms" against witches; Briggs finds that confessional division played no more than "a marginal role" in local persecution, p. 108) — but the mechanism was social atomization channeled through witch-prosecution, not a deliberate campaign against reproductive knowledge. For the purposes of this essay, the better-documented modern cases suffice to establish the pattern.

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  17. The argument that the household is a site of class exploitation rather than merely a support structure for wage labor has been developed most systematically under the heading of "social reproduction theory" — see Lise Vogel, Marxism and the Oppression of Women (1983), and Tithi Bhattacharya, ed., Social Reproduction Theory (2017). I developed the framework proposed here independently, but the overlap is substantial. Where I think my approach differs is in two respects. First, the "use values" framework is broader: it encompasses organizational hierarchies and ethnic exploitation alongside gendered domestic labor, treating all of these as instances of the same underlying mechanism. Second, and more fundamentally, the frame. SRT does not treat the household as auxiliary to production: its aim, as Vogel puts it, is "an approach that would enclose both production and reproduction within a unitary framework" (foreword to Bhattacharya, ed., pp. x–xi), and Bhattacharya treats the labor that produces people as "part of the systemic totality of capitalism" (p. 2). But the totality is organized around labor power, the commodity capital buys, so the household enters the analysis as the place where labor power is reproduced for capital, rather than as a site where class exploitation operates in its own right. What I'm arguing is that gendered exploitation is a class relation regardless of its relationship to capitalist production, and that a framework which can only see it as "reproductive" labor has already built in the narrowing I'm trying to overcome. The companion essay "Bred Into Existence: Reproduction, Property and Class Rule" at beyondmeritocracy.info develops the SRT engagement further, showing that Vogel's unitary theory, consistently applied, never had grounds to stop at the species line.

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  18. This definition operates at the level of social relations. It does not address the material substrate — energy, ecology — on which class rule depends. "Living and Non-Living: Why Emancipation Is an Energy Question" at beyondmeritocracy.info argues that the ratio of endosomatic to non-living exosomatic energy in a production system is a class-political variable: a structural condition of worker leverage, though not the only one, and one that bears on what forms of exploitation are available and what material preconditions emancipation requires. The distinction between living and non-living exosomatic energy — between exploitation of living bodies and extraction from fossil fuels, wind, or water — is what connects the social-relational analysis to its material preconditions, and its absence from this essay reflects this essay's focus on social relations rather than a judgment that the energy dimension is secondary.

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  19. Graeber's Debt: The First 5,000 Years gives an extreme case: a Maori "glutton" who kept asking fishermen for the best of their catch, which they could not refuse, until "one day, people decided enough was enough and killed him" (p. 116). His point is that relations of sharing are hard to convert into exchange, so the way out of being taken from is to end the relation. The line between "informal" and "institutional" is thinner than it appears.

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  20. Kant asked whether people could "sell themselves or let themselves out on hire" for sexual use and answered that they could not (Lectures on Ethics); his permissible form was marriage, "the Union of two Persons of different sex for life-long reciprocal possession of their sexual faculties" (Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Right, §24, in Hastie's translation). Pateman reads this as the contract theory that "came closest to presenting a view of marriage as nothing other than a contract of sexual use" (The Sexual Contract, pp. 168–170): the market is refused, and the same use is secured by lifelong contract instead.

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  21. The closest precedent for this concept is W.E.B. Du Bois's psychological wage of whiteness in Black Reconstruction in America (1935), where he argues that poor white Southerners received a "public and psychological wage" — preferential access to courts, public spaces, and social deference — that compensated for their economic exploitation and aligned them with the planter class against Reconstruction. The broader concept here extends past race to any arrangement of class-societal benefits, and the overlap is instructive: what Du Bois identified in the specific context of postbellum racial politics is an instance of the general mechanism described here. David Roediger's The Wages of Whiteness (1991) extends Du Bois's analysis into the formation of white working-class identity more broadly and is also relevant.

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  22. While the mechanism by which class-societal benefits generate ambivalence does not depend on imperialism (it operates in any class society with multiple forms of exploitation), the scale of those benefits in the core countries does. Many of the class-societal benefits this essay catalogues — cheap consumer goods, welfare state provision, national-institutional protections, the relative privilege of metropolitan workers over peripheral ones — are materially underwritten by imperial surplus transfer. "How Class Rule Generates Imperial Forms" at beyondmeritocracy.info develops this in detail, arguing that imperialism is a dimension of class rule rather than a separate phenomenon, and analyzing the specific mechanisms (value regime arbitrage, income deflation, competitive elimination of autonomous development) through which extraction from the periphery sustains the class arrangements that bind core-country workers to the system. The incorporation gradient developed there — the continuum from full membership in the national project to complete exclusion — also operates domestically: credentialed vs. uncredentialed, citizen vs. migrant, white vs. racialized are positions on the same gradient that structures imperial extraction abroad.

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  23. These four mechanisms do not operate statically. They deepen through a patterned sequence that "How Class Rule Generates Imperial Forms" at beyondmeritocracy.info calls the commodification sequence: the imposition of dependence (enclosure, fiscal coercion, withdrawal of public provision) puts people under the terms of whoever controls their replacement, by dispossession or by capture; extraction without reorganization (formal subsumption) captures the output of activities whose internal logic is not yet transformed; extraction through reorganization (real subsumption) reorganizes the activities themselves; financial mediation interposes debt between households and the now-commodified necessities; interconnection-deepening weaves those debts into the financial system's funding structure so that one node's failure propagates (in market-based systems through securitization into tradable claims, elsewhere through covered bonds or bank balance sheets); and state de-risking guarantees the income streams the financialized commodity yields. Each stage creates the institutional infrastructure and political constituency for the next — a ratchet operating within the commodification process itself. The four mechanisms described in the body text are present throughout, and the examples change as the sequence advances: the Tudor vagrancy statutes and colonial hut taxes are coercive enforcement at early stages, credentialism and the cultural coding of care work are artificial scarcity and the devaluation of labor at later ones.

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  24. The care of children is itself, across most of the cross-cultural and historical record, extracted in significant part from other children — older siblings, the majority of them girls ("but certainly not the overwhelming majority," as Weisner and Gallimore put it) (Thomas S. Weisner and Ronald Gallimore, "My Brother's Keeper: Child and Sibling Caretaking," Current Anthropology 18, no. 2 [1977]; Weisner, "Socialization for Parenthood in Sibling Caretaking Societies," 1987). In Weisner's ethnographic material it appears as a "duty" of siblings and as a child sent to "help" out, and the gendering is produced by differential task assignment rather than disposition — boys assigned the same caretaking show the same "nurturance." This is the devaluation mechanism operating on children's own labor, and it is one concrete content of the claim, below, that the exploitation of women and children is a form of class exploitation rather than a pre-capitalist residue.

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  25. Milkman, Gender at Work, pp. 29, 41 (married women dismissed first in Depression-era layoffs; some UAW locals signed agreements sanctioning discrimination against married women in layoffs); Jane Lewis, "Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes" (1992), p. 163 (a marriage bar kept married women out of the Irish civil service until 1977).

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  26. On the health costs of hierarchy, which is a different matter from lateral competition, see the Whitehall II findings in Michael Marmot, Status Syndrome (2004): among civil servants of the same grade, those with low control over their work had markedly more heart disease (pp. 127–28). The needs framework drawn from Max-Neef is developed in "Why Competing Solidarities Tend to Win" at beyondmeritocracy.info.

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  27. The incorporation gradient is developed fully in "How Class Rule Generates Imperial Forms" at beyondmeritocracy.info. Its central analytical contribution for the present argument is that the categories through which it operates — racial, ethnic, gendered, legal-status-based, credential-based — are not separate systems of oppression, however mutually constructing (Collins's term), but locally variable instantiations of a single mechanism: differential incorporation into the class order, with each position carrying a specific bundle of exposures and protections. The imperial forms framework essay demonstrates that the gradient predates capitalism — pre-capitalist European civilization was already hierarchically ordered through language, religion, and geographic origin (Slavs as sclavi, Irish and Welsh as subject populations, Roma and Jews sorted into specific legal-economic positions) — differences that served the same structural function of marking populations for differential treatment long before phenotypic "race" became the dominant sorting vocabulary. Losurdo (Liberalism: A Counter-History, 2011) shows how the liberal tradition then elaborated the justificatory infrastructure for these positions.

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  28. The question of why workers identify with nation, ethnicity, sector, or religion rather than with class — and why these identifications are so durable — is developed fully in "Why Competing Solidarities Tend to Win" at beyondmeritocracy.info. That essay reframes competing solidarities as formations on a contested field rather than deviations from the "true" class interest: class solidarity is one contestant among others, not the natural default. It develops a thirteen-dimension needs framework (drawing on Max-Neef and Rosenberg, grounded in biological-anthropological evidence) and six analytical tools — the organizing dimension (what provides coherence), the aspirational dimension (what provides a transcendent horizon), governance form (McAlevey's advocacy, mobilizing and organizing), sub-organizational architecture (how a movement's units are composed and which unit decides what), reproduction conditions (the material, legal, educational, communicative, and spatial infrastructure that determines which solidarities persist), and terms of belonging (the conditions under which a solidarity includes, excludes, and places demands on its members). Eleven case studies (four right-wing, seven left) show that the right's formations outcompete the left's not because they offer community control — they govern through mobilized forms that screen class divergence — but because they address more dimensions with greater depth, and because the reproduction conditions (institutional apparatus, state tolerance, education pipelines, media, spatial anchoring) are structurally asymmetric in their favor. The left's best historical cases (Spanish anarchism, the pre-1914 SPD, Red Vienna) achieved substantial dimensional breadth but lost it through specific mechanisms: professionalization, metabolization, cadre instrumentalization, and the state destruction of organizational infrastructure. The family's resilience as a competing solidarity rests on anchoring from four directions: class rule from above, men's non-reciprocal access to use values, parents' authority over and aspirational stake in their children, and women's relative safety from the risks of male communal spaces. The implication for the present essay is that the attachment to national, ethnic, or sectoral identity described here need not be ideological at all — it is a rational response to the fact that these forms of organization address more of what people need, under conditions where the state actively maintains the asymmetry.

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  29. See Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe (Oxford University Press, 1973), which documents how postwar guest worker programs across Western Europe functioned to segment labor markets along ethnic lines and to hold back unskilled wages, an effect they judge "may be great enough to hold down the general wage rate for the whole economy" (p. 478). They locate the roots of domestic workers' prejudice in competition and insecurity (pp. 459, 479) and find class consciousness giving way to a "sectional consciousness" (p. 459). The unions' record varied: the German unions, they write, "have probably done more than those of any other country to integrate the foreign workers into the labour force" (p. 130). Their four countries are Britain, France, West Germany and Switzerland. In my own experience of the Dutch SP, where I was a member until 2021, the party's engagement with migrant worker issues tended to frame the arrival of overworked and bunk-housed newcomers as a problem for existing neighborhoods, rather than organizing alongside these workers through the unions. The focus on work visa schemes — which tie residence to a permit and so make work outside it illegal, as though illegalization had ever empowered workers — illustrates how left organizing can reinforce rather than bridge ethnic divisions.

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  30. For the point about managers, I am indebted to David Graeber's Bullshit Jobs (2018), where a manager's importance is "measured by how many people he has working under him" (ch. 2) and administrators hire themselves "a retinue of minions" (ch. 4). The examples of professors and bureaucrats are mine.

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  31. The companion essay "Needs, Strategies, and the Compound Strategy of Directing Others" at beyondmeritocracy.info formalizes this. The reason these interests cohere as a "sum" rather than a list is that directing others' activity is a single compound strategy whose dimensional reach — the number of need-dimensions it addresses simultaneously — exceeds that of any alternative available under class conditions. The "sum of interests" is compound because a single strategy provides access to subsistence, protection, autonomy, efficacy, recognition, participation, identity, order, and play simultaneously, and losing the position threatens all of them at once. This is why the loss feels existential rather than adjustable, why partial challenges leave most dimensions intact, and why form-switching works: the individual redirects through whichever channel the challenge left uncontested, just as the fractions in control do at the structural level.

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  32. "Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another" — Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" (1784), trans. H. B. Nisbet, in Hans Reiss, ed., Kant: Political Writings, p. 54. Kant's target is the guardians, who "see to it" that the step to maturity looks "highly dangerous" (p. 54). The irony is that Kant framed this as a condition to be overcome, while those who invoke the logic in practice treat it as a permanent justification for their own mediating role. The same pattern recurs across every intermediary position in class society: the intermediary's role is justified by the claimed incapacity of those they mediate for, which is then never tested or relinquished.

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  33. This is a more developed version of what Lenin, drawing on Engels and Hobson, called the "labor aristocracy" thesis: the claim that imperialist superprofits allow ruling classes to buy off a privileged stratum of workers. The traditional formulation is crude — it reduces the mechanism to bribery from colonial surplus and treats the bought-off stratum as "the real agents of the bourgeoisie in the labour movement, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist class" (Lenin, Imperialism, preface to the French and German editions). The argument here differs in two respects: first, the mechanism is not bribery but the structural availability of class-societal benefits across multiple domains; second, it does not depend on imperialism at all. Worker investment in class rule is a feature of any class society with multiple forms of exploitation, not a special product of the imperial periphery. John Brolin supplies the piece of logic that keeps an argument of this kind from sliding into the version its critics assume — the one in which the metropolitan worker turns out to be capital's partner and the metropolitan class party pointless. Capitalists and metropolitan workers both draw on the existence of a low-wage region, but through separate channels, "through cheap labour and cheap goods respectively — yet no harmony of interests is required between rich-country workers and capitalists for there to be a disharmony of interests between rich- and poor-country workers" (review of the 2025 reissue of Emmanuel's Unequal Exchange, Journal of Labor and Society, 2026). Two channels, not one, and so two conclusions that hold together: the stake is real, and workers remain the antagonists of the capital that employs them. Brolin's own periodization of the three-cornered structure cuts against the flattering reading too, in either direction — the Keynesian golden age saw metropolitan workers gaining on capitalists and peripheral workers at once, the neoliberal decades saw capital and peripheral workers recover at metropolitan workers' expense (Lakner and Milanovic 2016).

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  34. The specific form that class-societal benefits take at any given moment is shaped by what "How Class Rule Generates Imperial Forms" at beyondmeritocracy.info calls the mediating configuration: six factors (logistical capacity and its cost, capital-fraction access to the state, target population resistance capacity, position on the incorporation gradient, legitimation infrastructure, and the configuration of competing powers) whose interaction determines which forms of extraction and compensation are available. See the note on the incorporation gradient, under "How non-market exploitation is maintained," for its domestic application.

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  35. The play dimension of status hierarchies helps explain why ideological critique alone fails to dislodge investment in class rule. You cannot argue someone out of a game they are playing for the experience of agency, any more than you can lecture someone out of a sport. What you can do is build organizational contexts in which experienced agency runs through different channels — collective decision-making, shared problem-solving, democratic governance of common resources — so that the status game loses its monopoly on what it feels like to matter. This is one reason the prefigurative tradition's insistence on democratic organizational practice is strategically important, not just morally preferable: it provides alternative avenues for experienced agency that compete with hierarchical status games. "Holding the Form Open" at beyondmeritocracy.info develops specific design features that address this — forced cross-membership, nested federation, and needs-based decision procedures each create contexts in which agency runs through collective channels rather than hierarchical ones.

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  36. Erik Olin Wright, Class Counts, p. 18: skilled employees appropriate surplus "as controllers of a scarce form of labor power"; p. 19: "power in labor markets to capture skill rents and power within production to capture loyalty rents."

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  37. Vivek Chibber's The Class Matrix (2022) makes a complementary but narrower argument: that workers' structural dependence on the market makes individual strategies (job-switching, credentialing, compliance) more rational than collective action, because individual strategies are cheaper, safer, and have more predictable returns. This is a real mechanism, and it helps explain why solidarity is the exception rather than the rule even among workers with no particular investment in hierarchy. But it can only explain passivity — why workers don't organize — and, through social closure, a range of active defense that is still market-rational: excluding competitors to protect a wage or credential premium is exactly the kind of individually rational market strategy Chibber's logic covers, so cross-racial sabotage and credential gatekeeping are partly within its reach. What it cannot reach is the non-market class relations — domestic, sexual, deference use values — where the benefit is not a market premium but direct dominion; men resisting the equalization of domestic labor is the clean case. These are workers investing in specific class relations because those relations deliver use values they want, not competitors priced out of a market. Chibber's framework also inherits the limitation this essay diagnoses in the broader tradition: by defining class exclusively through market dependence under capitalism, it has nothing to say about gendered exploitation, organizational hierarchy, or any of the non-market class relations that give large sections of the working class a stake in class rule as such. "How Class Rule Generates Imperial Forms" at beyondmeritocracy.info develops Chibber's analysis further in the imperial dimension, drawing on his argument that the class-power configuration determines whether developmental states can be installed and sustained — and specifically that whether a state can discipline private capital depends on the class configuration at the moment of state-building, not on a policy any state can choose: in Korea an export-led strategy, opened by Japanese patron firms, made capitalists need state coordination, while in India import-substitution let them resist it. That essay also develops the "window closing" argument: that the geopolitical conditions that made successful developmental states possible (Cold War sponsorship, metropolitan market access) are no longer available, which means the path South Korea and Taiwan followed is structurally foreclosed for most contemporary peripheral states.

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  38. James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution: What is Happening in the World (John Day, 1941). Burnham's political trajectory — from Trotskyist intellectual to senior editor of William F. Buckley's National Review from its founding — is itself instructive: his analysis of managerial power led him not toward a broader critique of class rule but toward a conservative politics; the 1941 book itself presents its thesis as prediction, not program ("I am not concerned, in this book at any rate, with whether the facts indicated by this theory are 'good' or 'bad'").

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  39. Erik Olin Wright's concept of "contradictory class locations" is the Marxist attempt that goes furthest in handling this problem — see Classes (1985) and Class Counts (1997). Wright tried to map intermediate positions onto a grid of exploitation-based class categories. The approach is more rigorous than the Ehrenreichs' but shares a fundamental limitation: it still maps people onto a typology of discrete locations (even with the mediated and temporal locations Wright adds, which let one person occupy several) rather than recognizing that class position is a continuum of stakes across multiple domains. The result is a taxonomy that keeps getting more elaborate without resolving the underlying analytical problem. The Ehrenreichs themselves rejected Burnham's reading: the PMC "has not become a new ruling class (as Berle and Means, Burnham, Galbraith and others have suggested). Top managers are part of the ruling class" (1977, n. 9).

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  40. See "On the Origins of the Professional Managerial Class," an interview with Barbara Ehrenreich in Dissent Magazine. The Ehrenreichs' analysis set the terms of the left's PMC debate, though it defined the stratum by a split between production and the "reproduction of capitalist culture" and class relations, a split this essay does not rely on.

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  41. See Macnair's review, "American 'Blue Labour'?" in the Weekly Worker, and his reply, "Centrality of Class" (Weekly Worker 1350, 2021), where the decline and division-of-labor arguments are made.

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  42. See L. Randall Wray, Understanding Modern Money (1998), and Mariana Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State (2014). In the richer and politically dominant states, the material tradeoff between state and private economic activity is far from zero-sum — except perhaps in times of genuine resource or labor scarcity.

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  43. Silja Häusermann and Hanspeter Kriesi, "What Do Voters Want? Dimensions and Configurations in Individual-Level Preferences and Party Choice," in The Politics of Advanced Capitalism, ed. Pablo Beramendi et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 216, Table 8.3 (European Social Survey 2008–09, fifteen West European countries; preferences for market liberalism, coefficients against production workers); Daniel Oesch, Redrawing the Class Map: Stratification and Institutions in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), whose direct test of party support finds that public-sector employment does not account for sociocultural professionals' left lean in Britain and Germany, and only in part in Switzerland (p. 120). The homeowners' revolt: Isaac William Martin, The Permanent Tax Revolt: How the Property Tax Transformed American Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 3 — "the tax rebels came from all walks of life." The left's loss of the argument: Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage, Taxing the Rich: A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). Over the same decades the highly educated as such moved toward the left in their vote: Thomas Piketty, "Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right," WID.world Working Paper 2018/7.

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  44. The argument against reading the stratum's growth as decline can be stated more formally through the imperial forms framework's critique of Marx's productive/unproductive labor distinction ("How Class Rule Generates Imperial Forms" at beyondmeritocracy.info, §"On productive and unproductive labor"). In Marx's technical sense, labor is productive when it is exchanged against capital and produces surplus value, and most salaried professionals fail one test or the other: those paid out of revenue — by the state, or out of a household's or a capitalist's personal income — because capital does not employ them at all, and those capital employs in buying, selling, accounting and finance, like the merchant's clerks of Capital vol. 3 (ch. 17), because their labor "does not create surplus-value" but does create the employer's "ability to appropriate surplus-value". Both are paid out of surplus produced elsewhere; the same teacher employed by a school run for profit is productive. The decline reading infers from their growth that capital is losing ground. But the imperial forms framework shows this misfires: the institutional apparatus (treaty lawyers, IMF staff, rating agencies, corporate accountants, the economists whose models naturalize extraction) is constitutive of how contemporary extraction operates, not parasitic on surplus produced elsewhere. Without them, contemporary extraction does not operate in its current institutionalized form — the point is about how it operates now, not that extraction was ever impossible without them (earlier epochs extracted by direct plunder). Their growth tracks the deepening and institutionalization of accumulation, not its decline. The "unproductive" framing misidentifies function as parasitism because it tracks a social form (who pays the wage) rather than the social function (what the labor enables).

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  45. The neoliberal approach centers on privatizing social goods and services to increase opportunities for private wealth extraction, while restricting help to the "deserving poor".

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  46. "The PMC" is not one "class." It combines multiple forms of exploitation and rent-seeking that its members have access to (Wright's "skill rents" and "loyalty rents" are two; Class Counts, pp. 18–19), even as most of them now work for wages. What unites them, in my reading, is a structural commitment to facilitating class relations and commodification (the Ehrenreichs' "reproduction of capitalist culture and capitalist class relations," extended to commodification), not a shared class interest in the Marxist sense.

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  47. Erik Olin Wright's concept of "contradictory class locations" is the Marxist attempt that goes furthest in handling this problem — see Classes (1985) and Class Counts (1997). Wright tried to map intermediate positions onto a grid of exploitation-based class categories. The approach is more rigorous than the Ehrenreichs' but shares a fundamental limitation: it still maps people onto a typology of discrete locations (even with the mediated and temporal locations Wright adds, which let one person occupy several) rather than recognizing that class position is a continuum of stakes across multiple domains. The result is a taxonomy that keeps getting more elaborate without resolving the underlying analytical problem. The Ehrenreichs themselves rejected Burnham's reading: the PMC "has not become a new ruling class (as Berle and Means, Burnham, Galbraith and others have suggested). Top managers are part of the ruling class" (1977, n. 9).

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  48. Hazing rituals in student organizations and the military teach class relations in compressed form: they humiliate, bond through shared humiliation, and teach that exploitation is either unavoidable or rewarding. The cycle is perpetuated by everyone's subsequent entitlement to treat the next cohort the same way. On hazing as an initiation humiliation ritual, imposed by an authority and preceding integration into a group, see William Ian Miller, Humiliation (Cornell, 1993), pp. 164–65; I develop the bonding and "pay it forward" mechanism in "Addressing the Central Issues," Weekly Worker 1365.

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  49. Barbara Ehrenreich, Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class (Pantheon, 1989). Because this stratum reproduces through education and credentials rather than heritable property, its position must be re-earned each generation: its "capital" cannot be "preserved beyond the lifetime of an individual, or, of course, bequeathed," and "must be renewed in each individual through fresh effort and commitment" (Introduction). On the middle-class parental mode itself, ch. 2 describes the middle-class permissive relationship as "a ceaseless, intense dialogue" in which "permission" must be "won, or at least fought over, minute by minute"; that the credential anxiety drives this mode is this essay's inference, not hers.

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  50. Daniel Tutt and C. Derick Varn, The People Are Not One (Revol Press, 2026), develop this through Therborn's alter-ideology: the petit-bourgeois alter-ideology "is violent because it is formed around an interest in avoiding proletarianization at all costs, even sometimes after proletarianization has already begun," carrying "elements of bourgeois hatred for the proletarian condition." As here, they treat the professional-managerial strata as internally contradictory and not a class in the strict sense (following Poulantzas against the Ehrenreichs' 1977 designation). I part from them only on what explains the stratum's growth: they trace it to the postwar restructuring of monopoly capitalism, where I take it, for the reasons given in Dispute 1, to track the advance of commodification, not capital's retreat.

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  51. Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State: "The first class antagonism which appears in history coincides with the development of the antagonism between man and woman in monogamian marriage, and the first class oppression with that of the female sex by the male" (Resistance Books ed., p. 73). Gerda Lerner dates the appropriation of women's sexual and reproductive capacity to before private property and class society and rejects Engels's labeling of the sex relation as class antagonism (The Creation of Patriarchy, pp. 8, 24).

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  52. Readers will notice the overlap with intersectionality theory as developed by Kimberlé Crenshaw and Patricia Hill Collins. The overlap is real: both insist that oppressions "work together in producing injustice" and that people's positions in one domain affect their positions in others (Collins, Black Feminist Thought, p. 18). Collins rejects "additive" models, treats race, class, gender and sexuality as "mutually constructing systems" (pp. 18, 227), and explains their co-occurrence through a matrix of domination whose domains of power "reappear across quite different forms of oppression" (p. 18). Where this framework differs is in grounding the intersection in a single generative principle — institutionalized taking in which those taken from cannot hold the taker to any return, rationalized through meritocratic reasoning. That is the reduction to "one fundamental type" Collins rejects (p. 18). The claim here is that this reduction earns its keep: it explains why these particular forms recur together across very different historical contexts, and how they trade against each other (form-switching, below), which the matrix of domination does not set out to derive.

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  53. "Merit All the Way Down" at beyondmeritocracy.info provides the metaethical grounding for this claim. That essay identifies the circular attribution described here as an instance of what it calls the predicative structure — the philosophical grammar, systematized from Plato through Aristotle and Foot, that converts situated behavior into attributed properties of persons and treats the products of arrangements as evidence of individual character. The structure is not merely a political technique but a feature of class-specific philosophical grammar, which is why it is so difficult to think past: the evaluative vocabulary available in class societies is built to sort persons, not to evaluate arrangements. Where the present essay provides the political economy (why the structure persists — because workers derive genuine use values from the arrangements it justifies), the metaethical essay provides the evaluative architecture (what kind of operation it is and what the alternative looks like).

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  54. Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, vol. 2, Notebook 3, §49, p. 53: "The press is the most dynamic part of the ideological structure, but not the only one. Everything that directly or indirectly influences or could influence public opinion belongs to it: libraries, schools, associations and clubs of various kinds"; the church's "incessant and patient efforts" on "its particular sector of this material structure of ideology."

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  55. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford, 1990), p. 133: "the charismatic (or meritocratic) ideology, a particular form of the giving of 'gifts', which explains differential access to qualifications by reference to the inequality of innate 'gifts'"; on the same page, it is "understandable that symbolic forms of domination should have progressively withered away as objective mechanisms came to be constituted which, in rendering the work of euphemization superfluous, tended to produce the 'disenchanted' dispositions that their development demanded." On symbolic violence in the pre-capitalist economy, p. 126 ("overt violence or symbolic violence, censored, euphemized, that is, misrecognizable, recognized violence"); on the struggle over its recognition among "age groups, the sexes, etc." and "the social classes," p. 303 n. 18.

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  56. Therborn's The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology (1980) arrives at a structurally similar taxonomy from different premises: his six modes of ideological domination include what he calls accommodation, in which "the ruled are constituted to regard other features in the world as more salient to them than both their present subordination and the possibility of an alternative regime" (p. 95), and resignation, obedience from "conceptions of the practical impossibility of a better alternative" (p. 98). The first is the unweighed register of the accommodation mode developed here, and the second maps onto foreclosure; the weighed register corresponds less to his accommodation than to his fear, which reaches sanctions as ordinary as losing one's job. His finding that accommodation is "probably the most common form by far of dominated acquiescence" (p. 95) is among the most useful in the legitimation literature, and it converges with the argument of this section, and though he says the weight of the modes varies "with the country and the time", he makes one comparison: in "many or most bourgeois-democratic countries" resignation, deference and accommodation are "probably more important components of consensus than is a sense of representation" (pp. 108–9), his mode of obedience to rulers seen as ruling on behalf of the ruled (p. 96). Extending that comparison to justificatory belief at large is this essay's step. I developed my typology independently, through the class-benefits analysis in the preceding sections, and arrived at a conclusion close to his: the mechanisms that raise the costs of contestation and prevent people from seeing how the system operates hold compliance in place without justificatory belief. Where the analysis diverges from Therborn: he retains ideology as the master category — even accommodation and resignation are theorized as modes of ideological interpellation — which subordinates the foreclosure-type mechanisms (what prevents contestation regardless of what people think) to the very cognitive frame his own findings press against. The imperial forms framework essay develops this critique and integrates Therborn's findings into an institutional analysis his own framing subordinates. A second divergence: Therborn ties class ideologies to their mode of production, and the desert argument appears in his work twice, as a defensive line in a general "logic of conservation" ("the poor and the powerless are misfits and failures who deserve what they get") and as the content of bourgeois alter-ideology, in which "workers have only themselves to blame for being workers" (p. 62): in both places tied to a class and its mode of production, not as the transhistorical circular structure this essay identifies as meritocratic reasoning. "Why Nobody Needs to Believe" at beyondmeritocracy.info develops the compliance-without-belief argument at full length.

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  57. "How Class Rule Generates Imperial Forms" at beyondmeritocracy.info develops the production-of-ignorance argument in the imperial dimension; "Why Nobody Sees the Whole" at beyondmeritocracy.info provides the full materialist account of how class rule organizes knowledge production. The relevant mechanisms include disciplinary fragmentation (economics separated from political science from international relations from development studies, so that the connections between extraction and prosperity cannot be made within any single disciplinary framework), the geographic scatter of dispossession (each specific enough that no population experiences enough of the pattern to name it as a system), machine fetishism (Hornborg's term for the way technology's productive power appears as a self-contained property of the machine rather than as dependent on global asymmetric resource flows), and the sacred/profane distinction (Losurdo's term for liberalism's rigorous delimitation of a restricted zone where political norms apply from a vast zone where they do not). These mechanisms do not suppress knowledge — they organize knowledge production so that the relevant connections cannot be seen from any one position within it.

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  58. See "Disciplined into Deserving: Education and the Reproduction of Meritocratic Reasoning" at beyondmeritocracy.info for a fuller account of how educational institutions and workplace structures encode and reproduce meritocratic reasoning, and how the postwar expansion of schooling coincided with a decline of solidaristic politics.

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  59. The interaction-mode ecology is developed fully in "Not Stages but Depths" at beyondmeritocracy.info, drawing on Fiske's four relational models (Structures of Social Life, 1991): communal sharing (CS — open-ended mutual aid, the ongoing unquantified obligation that is the social bond), authority ranking (AR — the asymmetric ordering in which some direct and others defer), equality matching (EM — turn-taking, balanced reciprocity between co-equal peers), and market pricing (MP — ratio commensuration through a common metric, closure upon settlement, the second criterion being the companion essay's rather than Fiske's, who maps the models to measurement scales). The critical structural distinction: CS and EM are open-ended — the ongoing obligation sustains the relationship — which is why both deposit organizational residue (rotating credit associations generate collective-action capacity that banks do not). MP is self-liquidating — settling up closes the account. The commodification sequence shifts the ecology from CS and EM toward MP, and that shift is the dominant route by which the relational substrate on which organizational capacity historically depended is consumed; the companion names the genus de-participation, of which administrative provision, reached without commodifying access, is the other route. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class documented the organizational half of this dynamic for one historical pass without the mechanism: friendly societies, trade clubs, corresponding societies and, despite itself, the Methodist chapel built lasting organizational capacity, much of it meeting in taverns and inns — the interaction-mode distinction supplies the reason he lacked (they sustained CS and EM, whatever the venue, where commercial sociability operated through MP). That contrast is the present argument's overlay, not Thompson's framing. "The Conditions of Care" at beyondmeritocracy.info develops the developmental mechanism: how the evaluative shift installs the disposition to rank persons in each generation through the family, across all parenting modes, before institutional socialization reinforces it.

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  60. The claim that organizations must embody the social relations they seek to create is central to the prefigurative politics tradition, from the anarchists through Murray Bookchin's libertarian municipalism to the Zapatistas' autonomous governance in Chiapas and the democratic confederalism practiced in Rojava. Where I think the argument of this essay adds something is in specifying why prefiguration matters: not as a moral preference for consistency, but because organizations that reproduce class relations internally are training their members in exactly the habits and justifications that sustain class rule externally. The companion essay "Holding the Form Open" at beyondmeritocracy.info develops the organizational design implications — four domain-specific principles targeting the mechanisms through which organizations reproduce class relations internally (coordinator crystallization, boundary hardening, aspirational capture, gendered domain separation), plus cross-cutting procedures contesting the meritocratic reasoning that rationalizes all four.

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  61. There is a biological complication here that I want to flag honestly, since it applies to my own prescriptions as much as to the arrangements I'm criticizing. Research on conditional altruism indicates that bonding and a defensive boundary are coupled (Balliet, Wu and De Dreu 2014 find the discrimination driven by in-group favoritism rather than out-group derogation; "Merit All the Way Down" at beyondmeritocracy.info sets out the rest of the behavioral evidence, including the threat-conditional half): the processes that produce trust, generosity, and care within a group also, under perceived threat, prime defensive suspicion toward those perceived as outside it — a conditional prosociality, in which the in-group-favoring effect is robust and out-group hostility is weak, defensive, and threat-conditional rather than a spontaneous accompaniment of the bond. This means that any organization that succeeds in building deep, multidimensional solidarity — the kind I argue is needed to outcompete nationalism, religion, and sectoralism — will, precisely because of that success, tend toward the exclusionary closure it is supposed to be an alternative to. Strong bonds, shared identity, and mutual care are the features that make a movement attractive; they are also the features that harden its boundary, license enforcement against internal dissenters and, under threat, turn suspicion outward. The defense of existing competing solidarities is not only a matter of rational self-interest (as argued in the body text) but of group identification that the bond itself reinforces, which means dislodging it requires building alternative forms of belonging that compete at the same level. But how do you build an organization that is strong enough to outcompete existing solidarities while maintaining permeable boundaries, welcoming dissent, and extending concern beyond its membership? The evidence says the two pull against each other — through the in-group preference that comes with the bond, and, under threat, through the hostile face. This is a constrained design problem. The design bet is that the out-group-hostile face of the coupling, being threat-gated, can largely be kept dormant by managing the threat conditions that trigger it — but that is a bet, not an established result, and its weakest point is exactly the chronic external threat (repression, siege, the scalar problem) under which core-country organizing actually occurs, which is the condition that activates the hostile face. And even granting it, what cannot be eliminated is the in-group preference gradient itself, which is not threat-gated; the boundary hardening and internal enforcement that express it are. But the system is context-dependent: the favoritism follows the expectation of being favored in return, so the same coupling that promotes exclusion under intergroup competition extends trust and cooperation to those from whom reciprocity is expected (Balliet, Wu and De Dreu 2014), and the boundary moves with the arrangement that organizes reciprocity; neither face is more biological than the other. Institutional form has leverage because it determines which conditions are in place, and therefore which expression of the system predominates. "Holding the Form Open" at beyondmeritocracy.info takes it up and proposes four domain-specific design principles — forced cross-membership against coordinator-class crystallization, nested federation against boundary hardening, practice-grounded horizons against aspirational capture, and autonomous gendered infrastructure against gendered domain separation — plus cross-cutting needs-based decision procedures that contest the meritocratic reasoning operating within all four. The comparative evidence (from "Why Competing Solidarities Tend to Win" at beyondmeritocracy.info) suggests these features shift where on the breadth/coerciveness frontier an organization sits. Because the out-group hostility it most fears is threat-gated rather than a fixed accompaniment of deep bonds, managing threat-perception might also lower the frontier itself, but that is a conjecture the record does not establish. What they do not dissolve is the in-group preference gradient, which is not threat-conditional. The companion is explicit that this is the weaker claim: breadth and boundary-coerciveness covary across the cases regardless of political valence, there is likely a floor below which coerciveness cannot be reduced without losing breadth, and design buys leverage over where on the frontier an organization sits, not elimination of the exclusionary response. The positive cases all operated under material conditions substantially different from core-country metropolitan organizing, which is where the argument most needs to apply. For an accessible synthesis of research on the interaction between politics and biology, see Arnold Schroder's podcast Fight Like an Animal and his post on the biology of the left/right divide.

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  62. The developmental trap is analyzed in detail in "How Class Rule Generates Imperial Forms" at beyondmeritocracy.info, through the Soviet, Chinese, and Haitian cases. The Haitian case shows the mechanism at work: the revolution succeeded in closing chattel slavery, but the developmental trap bounded what the revolutionary state could build and how fast, and Toussaint's government reproduced coerced labor on the plantations — not because of personal betrayal but because the only economy Saint-Domingue had was the plantation economy and the surplus needed for military defense had to be generated from it; the base constrained the rate at which an alternative could be built, but compelling the labor was a governing decision with an author and a date. Marx himself identified the constraint: under "real subsumption," the machinery a post-revolutionary society inherits is constitutively shaped by capital's requirements — workers lose subjective capacity, cooperation becomes an alien power, and the technological infrastructure presupposes the relations of domination that produced it. Saito (Marx in the Anthropocene, 2023), recovering Marx's late distinction between productive forces of capital and productive forces of social labour, adds the ecological dimension: left in place, the productive forces of capital keep production ecologically destructive as well as despotic. The imperial forms framework extends this: the inherited machinery presupposes ecological throughput rates — cheap energy, cheap nature, externalized waste — that it identifies as unsustainable. The path through more machinery is blocked twice: more machinery is needed to escape the trap, but it closes the employment window further (each wave of industrialization absorbs less labor per unit of output) — a constraint beyond the body's three — and the machinery presupposes ecological conditions whose continuation degrades the material base, the body's third.

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  63. This definition operates at the level of social relations. It does not address the material substrate — energy, ecology — on which class rule depends. "Living and Non-Living: Why Emancipation Is an Energy Question" at beyondmeritocracy.info argues that the ratio of endosomatic to non-living exosomatic energy in a production system is a class-political variable: a structural condition of worker leverage, though not the only one, and one that bears on what forms of exploitation are available and what material preconditions emancipation requires. The distinction between living and non-living exosomatic energy — between exploitation of living bodies and extraction from fossil fuels, wind, or water — is what connects the social-relational analysis to its material preconditions, and its absence from this essay reflects this essay's focus on social relations rather than a judgment that the energy dimension is secondary.

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  64. The welfare-imperialism circuit is developed fully in "How Class Rule Generates Imperial Forms" at beyondmeritocracy.info. The scale is not marginal: Hickel, Sullivan, and Zoomkawala (2021), using their preferred exchange-rate method, estimate that the annual transfer has represented up to 7% of Northern GDP (peaking around 2008, declining to roughly 5% by 2017). That magnitude is method-sensitive, but it is a serious peer-reviewed estimate of scale, not a slogan. The postwar golden age of European social democracy coincided with a period of terms-of-trade advantage for metropolitan economies and with the temporary elimination of industrial competition through wartime destruction — the destruction and disorganization of German, Japanese and continental European industry creating a window of margins that would have been hard to reach under normal competitive conditions. Each welfare-state regime type (Esping-Andersen's liberal, corporatist, and social democratic) distributed the imperial surplus differently and, while the circuit held, sustained different competing-solidarity structures. What Esping-Andersen does not ask is where the surplus came from or what it meant that the populations among which it was distributed had been sorted in advance. The typology describes three ways of distributing imperial surplus within a pre-sorted and internally stratified included population; it does not describe three models for building solidarity in diverse societies.

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  65. I have written more extensively about the organizational challenges posed by NGOs and professional activism here in Dutch; the English expanded version is "What to Do About NGOs?" at beyondmeritocracy.info.

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  66. The Caucus of Rank-and-File Educators (CORE) won leadership of the Chicago Teachers Union in 2010 and subsequently led the 2012 strike, the first major teachers' strike in Chicago in twenty-five years. For the organizational transformation, see Micah Uetricht, Strike for America: Chicago Teachers Against Austerity (Verso, 2014). The case is notable because CORE's success depended on building alliances with parents and communities — addressing dimensions beyond the workplace — while maintaining rank-and-file control over strategy. On the subsequent trajectory — the withheld audits, the REAL caucus challenge, and what the case now shows about the distinction between permissive and preventive structural features — see "Whose Power Is It?" at beyondmeritocracy.info (which develops the CTU/Kloofdichters comparison) and "Holding the Form Open" at beyondmeritocracy.info (which develops the design implications).

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  67. "Why Competing Solidarities Tend to Win" at beyondmeritocracy.info develops the MST as a full case study. Key sources: Rebecca Tarlau, Occupying Schools, Occupying Land (Oxford, 2019) for the education system and "contentious co-governance"; Miguel Carter, ed., Challenging Social Inequality (Duke, 2015) for cooperative agriculture, settlement-level governance, and the PT metabolization (especially Carter's epilogue on the land reform debacle and Branford's chapter on navigating PT governments); Leandro Vergara-Camus, Land and Freedom (Zed, 2014) for the MST-Zapatistas comparison and territorial decommodification; Christine Chaves, "Mystique: MST Rituals and Dilemmas" (Revista de Antropologia, 2022) and Daniela Issa, "Praxis of Empowerment" (Latin American Perspectives, 2007) for the mística; Djacira Araújo, Pedagogia Do Movimento Sem Terra e Relações de Gênero (Lutas Anticapital, 2019) for the gender analysis.

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  68. See Jane McAlevey, No Shortcuts: Organizing for Power in the New Gilded Age (Oxford University Press, 2016). Her subsequent A Collective Bargain (2020) carries the method from the contract to elections and legislation: supermajorities, she argues, also build "governing power" (ch. 7, "As Go Unions, So Goes the Republic"). "Whose Power Is It?" at beyondmeritocracy.info develops McAlevey's organizing/mobilizing/advocacy triad and applies it to the Dutch and US labor cases.

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  69. See Barbara Ransby, Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision (University of North Carolina Press, 2003). On SNCC's internal fractures, see also Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Harvard University Press, 1981).

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  70. See Michael Staudenmaier, Truth and Revolution: A History of the Sojourner Truth Organization, 1969–1986 (AK Press, 2012). James's influence on STO ran to its approach to working-class self-activity and the struggle against white supremacy; for the state-capitalist analysis of the Johnson-Forest Tendency, see C.L.R. James, Raya Dunayevskaya and Grace Lee Boggs, State Capitalism and World Revolution (1950).

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  71. See Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1968); Myles Horton, The Long Haul: An Autobiography (1990); Myles Horton and Paulo Freire, We Make the Road by Walking: Conversations on Education and Social Change (1990). On Highlander's history, see John M. Glen, Highlander: No Ordinary School (University Press of Kentucky, 1988; 2nd ed. 1996).

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  72. The form-switching analysis is developed fully in "How Class Rule Generates Imperial Forms" at beyondmeritocracy.info, which traces the mechanism across dozens of cases. The American case traces the mechanism across two centuries: the trajectory from chattel slavery through Reconstruction through convict leasing through Jim Crow through civil rights through mass incarceration illustrates form-switching across two centuries, with each transition after the first forced by organized resistance (the first came from above, through the Civil War and Reconstruction) and each new form operating under the changed legitimation constraints the transition produced. Therborn (The Killing Fields of Inequality, 2013) notes the pattern: existential inequality has been "in steep decline" internationally since 1945 (p. 83), able to advance to the extent it was "decoupled from resource inequality," and "powerful elites have found the issue a gift of costless egalitarianism," while the major economic equalization within rich countries "ended around 1980" (p. 145). His own mechanism (pp. 144–145) is that existential equality advanced where it was "decoupled from resource inequality"; the exception is Tilly's pairing of categories, which he judges "no longer quite relevant," granting the professional classes' dependence on immigrant servants but denying that their wealth derives from it. The imperial forms framework's "reproductive unequal exchange" is a pairing of that kind, and the framework shows why the concession is cheap: once everyone must deal through markets, value transfers through the price mechanism "even in a perfectly 'fair' trading system" (Cluster A, the price-system floor), and the contract binds "formally equal parties under structurally coerced conditions" (the institutional substrate), so equal standing leaves the transfer intact. The fractions the sorting serves concede what costs them nothing (recognition) while intensifying what costs others everything (extraction).

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  73. Ambedkar's analysis of caste appears to parallel this essay's argument. Caste, for him, assigns occupations "not on the basis of trained original capacities, but on that of the social status of the parents" (§4.2); and when reformers proposed to replace it with a chaturvarnya "based on worth," he answered that keeping the old labels, "indicative of social divisions based on birth, is a snare," and that a system based on worth could not be built without first breaking up "the four thousand castes, based on birth" (§§15–16). On this essay's reading, that is meritocratic reasoning met at its point of entry: a ranking by worth offered to legitimate positions that were never acquired by worth. His strategic conclusion — that caste cannot be abolished by economic reform alone because it operates across domains a purely economic framework cannot see — would, if the reading holds, constitute independent confirmation from a very different context. See B.R. Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste (1936); S. Anand's critical edition with an introduction by Arundhati Roy (Verso, 2014). The companion essay "Why Competing Solidarities Tend to Win" at beyondmeritocracy.info develops the Hindutva case, where Ambedkar's analysis is directly relevant: Dalits and OBCs are conditionally included on condition they abandon Ambedkar's material demands. I am not yet sufficiently familiar with the secondary literature on Ambedkar's organizing practice — as opposed to his constitutional politics — to assess how far the parallel extends.

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